Is the U.S. Current Account Deficit Sustainable? And If Not, How Costly is Adjustment Likely To Be? by Sebastian Edwards
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
IS THE U.S. CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT
SUSTAINABLE? AND IF NOT, HOW COSTLY








This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Spring 2005 meeting of the Brookings Panel on
Economic Activity.  I thank Ed Leamer for helpful discussions, and Roberto Alvarez for his assistance.  I am
grateful to the editors and to my discussants Katharine Dominguez and Pierre-Olivier Gorinchas for their
comments.  The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
©2005 by Sebastian Edwards.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Is the U.S. Current Account Deficit Sustainable? And If Not, How Costly is Adjustment Likely
To Be?
Sebastian Edwards
NBER Working Paper No. 11541
August  2005
JEL No. F02, F43, O11
ABSTRACT
In this paper I analyze the relationship between the U.S. dollar and the U.S. current account. I deal
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I.  Introduction 
During the last few years a large number of analysts in academia, the private 
sector and applied research institutions have expressed increasing concerns regarding the 
growing U.S. current account deficit.  There is a generalized sense that the current 
situation of global imbalances is unsustainable and that adjustment will have to take place 
sooner rather than later. The unprecedented magnitude of the U.S. current account deficit 
and the growing net indebtedness of the U.S. have fueled analysts’ worries, with many 
arguing that unless something is done, the world will move toward a major financial 
crisis.
1  Some authors have gone as far as suggesting an imminent collapse of the U.S. 
dollar, and a global financial meltdown.
2  The main idea behind this view is that if the 
U.S. current account deficit is maintained at its current level, U.S. net international 
liabilities will reach 100% of GDP, a figure considered to be excessively large.
3 In a 
recent paper, Mussa (2004) has said: 
 
“[T]here is probably a practical upper limit for the US net external liabilities at 
something less than 100 percent of US GDP and, accordingly...current account 
deficits of 5 percent or more of US GDP are not indefinitely sustainable.” (Mussa 
2004, p 114). 
 
The source of financing of the U.S. current account deficit has also become a 
source of concern. A number of authors have argued that by relying on foreign -- and 
particularly Asian -- central banks’ purchases of Treasury securities, the U.S. has become 
particularly vulnerable to sudden changes in expectations and economic sentiments.
4  
Robert Skidelsky has recently argued in The New York Times that the value of the 
dollar is one of the most important sources of political tension between the United States 
and Europe.  According to him, “[U]nilateralism is not more acceptable in currency 
matters than in foreign policy.”  More specifically, Skidelsky has pointed out that,   
                                                 
1   Although most of the alarmist discussions have come in the form of Op-Ed pieces, there have also been 
a few policy papers on the subject.  See, for example, Roubini and Setser (2004). 
2   See, for example, Roubini and Setser (2004).  For an excellent set of papers on the subject see Bergsten 
and Williamson (2004). 
3   See Mussa (2004) for a very clear discussion of this issue.   
4 See, for example, Martin Wolf’s October 1
st, 2003 article in the Financial Times, “Funding America’s 
recovery is a very dangerous game,”  (page 15).    3 
 “The United States is the only major country proclaiming itself indifferent to its 
currency value.  In countries running persistent current account deficits, governments 
normally -- indeed must – reduce domestic consumption.  But so far, the United States 
has relied on other countries to adjust their economies to profligate American spending… 
(The New York Times, February 20
th, 2005, p.9)   
 
There is, however, an alternative view.  Some authors have argued that in an era 
of increasing financial globalization and rapid U.S. productivity gains, it is possible – 
even logical and desirable -- for the U.S. to run (very) large current account deficits for a 
very long period of time (say, a quarter of a century).  According to this view, growing 
international portfolio diversification implies that the “rest of the world” will be willing 
to accumulate large U.S. liabilities during the next few years; maybe even in excess of 
100% of U.S. GDP. According to this perspective, since the U.S. current account deficit 
does not pose a threat, there are no fundamental reasons to justify a significant fall in the 
value of the U.S. dollar (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2004a, 2004b). 
5 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the U.S. dollar 
and the U.S. current account.  In particular, I deal with issues of sustainability and I 
discuss the mechanics of current account adjustment.  I develop a portfolio model of the 
current account and I show that even under a very positive scenario, where foreigners’ 
(net) demand for U.S. assets doubles relative to its current level, the U.S. current account 
will have to go through a significant adjustment in the (not too distant) future.  Indeed, it 
is not possible to rule out a scenario where the U.S. current account deficit would shrink 
abruptly by 3 to 6 percent of GDP.  In order to have an idea of the possible consequences 
of this type of adjustment, I analyze the international evidence on current account 
reversals.  The results from this empirical investigation indicate that significant current 
account reversals have tended to result in large declines in GDP growth.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  In section II I provide some 
background information and data.  I discuss the evolution of the U.S. real exchange rate 
(RER) and current account during the last three decades, and I analyze some of the 
statistical properties of the RER.  I discuss the sources of deficit financing and I analyze 
                                                 
5  See, also, Cooper (2004), and Caballero, Farhi and Hammour (2004).   4 
the evolution of the U.S. net international assets position.   In this section I also provide 
international comparisons, and I put the current U.S. situation in a global comparative 
context.  In Section III I deal with the analytics of current account and real exchange rate 
adjustment.  The analysis presented in this section focuses on transitional dynamics, and 
goes beyond computations of the “required” real depreciation of the dollar to achieve 
current account sustainability.  I develop a portfolio model of current account behavior, 
and I discuss the response of the current account to changes in international portfolio 
choices.  The model is quite general and allows for valuation effects stemming from 
exchange rate changes, and for changes in the international terms of trade.  I show that 
under plausible parameters, an increase in the demand for U.S. assets by foreign investors 
results in an “overshooting” of the current account deficit.  According to the model the 
current account deficit will increase until, at some point, it will experience a reversal.  
The reversal may, indeed, be quite abrupt and significant.  In Section IV I use a large 
cross-country data set to investigate the international evidence on current account 
reversals.  In particular, I investigate whether countries that have experienced significant 
and rapid reversals have faced real costs in the form of a decline in the rate of GDP 
growth.  I argue that in spite of the uniqueness of the U.S., as a large country whose 
currency is at the center of the global financial system, this comparative analysis provides 
useful information on the likely costs an eventual U.S. current account adjustment. The 
paper closes with Section V, where I discuss some global policy challenges and I offer 
some concluding remarks.  
II.  The U.S. Dollar and the Current Account:  A Thirty Years Perspective 
In this section I analyze the evolution of the U.S. real exchange rate and current 
account since the adoption of floating exchange rates in the early 1970s.  The section is 
divided in three parts:
 6  First, I discuss the evolution of the U.S. real exchange rate 
(RER) and current account during the last three decades, and I deal with the changing 
                                                 
6   Due to space considerations I have not discussed in detail some important issues, such as the stationarity 
of the RER and its (changing) volatility through time.  Most recent analyses based on panel data have found 
that the RER is stationary and that its half-life cycle is lower than the 3 to 5 years traditionally considered 
as the “consensus view.”  See Choi, Mark and Sul (2005).  An analysis of U.S. RER volatility indicates that 
for the complete period (1975-2004) the U.S. real exchange rate index exhibited one of the highest 
volatilities in the sample.  Only the British pound, the Japanese yen, and the euro have higher volatilities.  
Second, RER volatility for the U.S. dollar was highest in 1985-1989.  This period corresponds, mostly, to 
the rapidly depreciating Phase III in Figure 2.    5 
nature of the U.S. trade-weighted RER index.  I argue that it is possible to divide the last 
thirty years of RER behavior into six distinct phases.  Second, I discuss the most recent 
data on the U.S. current account, including its sources of financing. And third, I provide 
some international evidence on current account imbalances during the last three decades. 
This comparative analysis allows to place the U.S. recent experience in a historical 
context. 
II.1  Six Phases of Real Exchange Rate Behavior 
In Figure 1 I present quarterly data for the U.S. current account balance as 
percentage of GDP, as well as on the evolution of the Federal Reserve trade-weighted 
index of the U.S. dollar real exchange rate for the period 1973-2004; in this Figure – as in 
the rest of this paper --, an increase in the RER index represents a real exchange rate 
appreciation.  Several interesting features emerge from Figure 1: First, it shows that 
deficits have become increasingly large since 1992.  Second, Figure 1 shows that for the 
first decade of floating exchange rates (1973-1982), the US ran, on average, a small 
current account surplus of 0.04% of GDP.  In contrast, for the period 1983-2004 the 
average current account balance has been a deficit of 2.4% of GDP.  Figure 1 also shows 
that during the period under consideration the RER index experienced significant 
movements: its mean was 105.3, its minimum 91.2, and its maximum was 136.3.  Finally, 
Figure 1 shows a pattern of negative correlation between the trade-weighted real value of 
the dollar and the current account balance.  Periods of strong dollar have tended to 
coincide with periods of (larger) current account deficits.  Although the relation is not 
one-to-one, the degree of synchronicity between the two variables is quite high: the 
contemporaneous coefficient of correlation between the (log of the) RER index and the 
current account balance is –0.53; the highest correlation of coefficient is obtained when 
the log of the RER is lagged three quarters (-0.60).  
Recent policy debates on the value of the U.S. dollar illustrate the massive 
changes that have occurred in U.S. trade relations during the last three decades.  While in 
the early 1970’s dollar-related discussions dealt almost exclusively with bilateral 
exchange rates – both nominal and real -- with respect to the industrial countries, more 
recent debates have increasingly focused on the behavior of emerging countries’ 
currencies, including the Chinese renminbi, the Korean won, and the Malaysian ringgit.    6 
During the last few years the Mexican peso has also become an important currency in 
determining the trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar; this was not the case in 1973, 
when the Smithsonian Agreement was abandoned.   Between 1995 and 2005 China’s 
weight in the Federal Reserve trade-weighted real exchange rate index has gone from 
5.67% to 11.35%; Mexico’s weight has increased from 6.95% to 10.04%.  On the other 
hand, during the same period, Japan’s weight has declined from 16.54% to 10.58%.  
Overall, today’s trade-weighted U.S. RER is dominated by the Asian nations – as a 
group, the Asian countries (excluding India) have a weight in the index of 38.8%.  
Commodity currencies, as a group, are also very important, with a weight of 24.6%.  
Finally, the launching of the Euro in 1999 has marginalized the British pound.  Although 
a weight of 5.2% is still quite “respectable,” the pound is not any longer among the top 5 
currencies in the index.  The situation was quite different in 1998, when the weight of the 
British pound was higher than that of all, but one, of the currencies that eventually would 
conform the euro (in 1998 the German mark had a weight of 6.4% and the British pound 
had a weight of 5.9%).
7 
As may be seen from Figure 1, it is possible to distinguish six distinct phases in 
U.S. dollar real exchange rate behavior for the thirty-year period 1975-2004.  A brief 
analysis of these six phases provides a summary of the history of the international 
financial system since the inception of floating:
8 
·   Phase I:  1973Q1-1978Q4.  This period includes the early years of floating, 
and was characterized by a depreciating trend of the U.S. RER.  The 
accumulated depreciation amounted to 18.1% during 24 quarters.  During this 
period the standard deviation of the monthly log differences of the RER index 
was 0.0205.  During the early part of this phase (1973-76) the current account 
was in surplus.  This, however, turned into a small deficit in the years 1977 
and 1978.   
·   Phase II:  1979Q1-1985Q1.  During these 26 quarters the U.S. dollar RER 
experienced a 49.3% appreciation.  During this phase the current account 
                                                 
7   In 2005 the euro has a weight of 18.80%; in 1995 the currencies that conformed the euro had a combined 
weight of 17.30%. 
8   Figure 1 presents the Fed broad RER index.  The same six phases are observed if alternative indexes are 
used.   7 
went into deficit, reaching 2.9% of GDP in the third quarter of 1984.  The 
standard deviation of the monthly log differences of the RER index was 0.022, 
slightly higher than that of Phase I.  In view of the substantial strengthening of 
the dollar and the related increase in the U.S. current account deficit, on 
September 25
th 1985 the members of the G-5 (The United Sates, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, France, and Germany) decided to implement concerted and 
coordinated interventions in the foreign exchange market.  As part of this 
agreement – known as the Plaza Accord – the G-5 countries committed 
themselves to put in place coordinated macroeconomic policies that would 
reduce the costs of the global adjustment process.
9   
·  Phase III:  1985Q2-1988Q4.  During this period the dollar real exchange rate 
experienced a rapidly depreciating trend.  The peak-to-trough change in the 
index was -28.7%.  Real exchange rate volatility increased substantially 
during this 16 quarter period; the standard deviation of the monthly log 
differences of the RER index was 0.0268, substantially higher than in the 
previous two phases. The current account deficit continued to grow, until in 
mid 1987 it stabilized at around 3.6% of GDP.  From that point onward the 
current account began to improve, and by the fourth quarter of 1988 the deficit 
had declined to 2.4% of GDP.  On February 22, 1987 the Ministers of Finance 
and Central Bank Governors of the G-6 (G-5 plus Canada) released a 
communiqué – known as the Louvre Accord -- informing the public that 
significant progress had been made in achieving global adjustment, and that 
“further substantial exchange rate shifts among their currencies could damage 
growth and adjustment prospects in their countries…”  The Louvre Accord 
communiqué went on to say that the G-6 countries “agreed to cooperate 
closely to foster stability of exchange rates around current levels.”
10   
·  Phase IV:  1989Q1-1995Q2.  During this Phase the real value of the dollar 
continued to depreciate, but at a much lower rate than in the preceding Phase; 
during these 27 quarters the dollar depreciated in real terms by 10%.  During 
                                                 
9   For the text of the Plaza Accord communiqué, see http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm850922.htm. 
10   See the text of the Louvre Accord at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm870222.htm. 
   8 
this period the standard deviation of the monthly log differences of the RER 
index was 0.0232.  During this phase the current account balance continued to 
improve, until in the first quarter of 1991 the U.S. posted its first current 
account surplus in many years.  During Phase IV the average current account 
balance was -1.15% of GDP.   
·   Phase V:  1995Q3-2002Q1.  This is phase is characterized by a trough-to-
peak real exchange rate appreciation of 33.4% (notice from Figure 1 that 
between the fourth quarter of 1998 and the fourth quarter of 1999 there was a 
short lived period of real depreciation).  Interestingly, during this phase real 
exchange rate volatility declined significantly; the standard deviation of the 
monthly log differences of the RER index was 0.0196.  This phase was 
characterized by an increasingly larger current account deficit.  While in late 
1995 early 1996 the deficit was in the order of 1.5% of GDP, by early 2002 it 
was hovering just below 4% of GDP.  In 1999, and for the first time in many 
years, the U.S. federal government posted a surplus. 
·  Phase VI:  2002Q2-2004Q4.  This phase is continuing at the time of this 
writing.  Between the second quarter of 2002 and the fourth quarter of 2004 
the real value of the dollar experienced a 14% accumulated depreciation.  The 
current account deficit continued to widen, exceeding 5% of GDP towards the 
end of the sample.  Real exchange rate volatility increased slightly during this 
period; the standard deviation of the log differences of the RER index was 
0.0212.  Other important macroeconomic developments during this phase 
include the worsening of the U.S. fiscal position, and the stiff increases in the 
price of oil and other commodities.   
 
In Figure 2 I go beyond the current account, and I present data from 1973 through 
2004 for: (a) the balance of trade of goods and services as a percentage of GDP; (c) the 
balance of trade in (non financial) services as a percentage of GDP; (c) the income 
account, also as a percentage of GDP and (d) the transfers account as a percentage of 
GDP.  A number of important facts emerge from these figures.  First, as Panel A shows, 
large and persistent trade deficits have preceded in time the era of large current account   9 
deficits.  Already in the late 1970s the trade account was negative, and since mid 1976 it 
has had only one surplus quarter (1992Q2).
11  Second, since 1996 the trade surplus in non 
financial services has declined steadily; in 2004 it was only 0.3 percent of GDP.   Third, 
Panel C shows that the income account continues to be positive.  Since for quite some 
years now the U.S. international investment position has been negative – that is, the U.S. 
has been a net debtor --, the fact that the income account is still positive may seem 
surprising.  The reason for this is that the return on U.S. assets held by foreigners has 
been systematically lower than the return on foreign assets in hands of U.S. nationals.  
Finally, Panel D shows that the transfers account has been negative since 1946.  During 
the last few years transfers account deficit has been stable at approximately 0.7% of 
GDP. 
II.2  Recent Current Account Imbalances 
In Table 1 I present data on the current account as a percentage of GDP, and its 
financing for the period 1990-2004.  As may be seen, during the last few years the nature 
of external financing has changed significantly.  In particular, since 2002 net FDI flows 
have been negative.  This contrasts with the 1997-2001 period when FDI flow 
contributed in an increasingly important way to deficit financing.  Also, after four years 
on net positive equity flows (1998-2002), these became negative in 2003-04.  As the 
figures in Table 1 show, during 2003 and 2004 the U.S. current account deficit was fully 
financed through net fixed income flows.  Official foreign purchases of government 
securities (Reserves (net), in Table 1) have played a particularly important role in the 
financing of the 2003 and 2004 current account deficits.  A number of analysts have 
argued that by relying on foreign central banks’ purchases of Treasury securities, the U.S. 
has become particularly vulnerable to sudden changes in expectations and economic 
sentiments.
12 
Current account imbalances are reflected in changes in a country’s net 
international investment position (NIIP): deficits result in a deterioration of the NIIP, and 
surpluses result in an improvement in the U.S. NIIP.  In Figure 3 I present the evolution 
                                                 
11   Mann (2004) shows that most of the U.S. trade deficit is explained by a deficit in automobiles and 
consumer goods. 
12 See, for example, Martin Wolf’s October 1
st, 2003 article in the Financial Times, “Funding America’s 
recovery is a very dangerous game,”  (page 15).    10 
of the U.S. NIIP as percentage of GDP.  As may be seen, this has become increasingly 
negative: in 2004 U.S. net international liabilities reached 29 percent of GDP.  An 
important feature of the NIIP is that gross U.S. international assets and gross U.S. 
international liabilities are held in different currencies.  While more than 70% of gross 
foreign assets held by U.S. nationals are denominated in foreign currency, approximately 
95% of gross U.S. liabilities in hands of foreigners are denominated in U.S. dollars.  This 
means that the net liabilities as a percentage of GDP are subject to “valuation effects” 
stemming from changes in the value of the dollar.  A dollar depreciation reduces the 
value of net liabilities.  As a result of this valuation effect, the deterioration of the U.S. 
NIIP during 2002-2004 was significantly smaller than the accumulated current account 
deficit during those two years; see Table 2 for details.  
A key question in current account sustainability analyses – and one I discuss in 
detail below – refers to the “reasonable” long run equilibrium value the ratio of U.S. net 
international liabilities; the higher this ratio is, the higher will be the “sustainable” current 
account deficit.  According to some authors the current ratio of almost 30% of GDP is 
excessive, while others believe that a NIIP to GDP ratio of up to 50% would be 
reasonable.
13  
One of the first things undergraduate students of open economy macroeconomics 
learn is that the current account is the difference between savings and investment.  
Through time a number of authors have argued that a worsening of a current account 
balance that stems from an increase in investment is very different from one that results 
from a decline in national savings.  Some have gone as far as arguing that very large 
deficits in the current account “don’t matter,” as long as they are the result of higher 
(private sector) investment (Corden, 1994).  As Figure 4 shows, the recent deterioration 
of the U.S. current account has largely been the result of a decline in national savings, 
and in particular of public and household savings.  A simple implication of this trend – 
and one that is emphasized by most authors – is that an improvement in the U.S. current 
account situation will not only imply a RER adjustment; it will also require an increase in 
the national savings ratio, and in particular in household savings.  Symmetrically, a 
                                                 
13   See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) and Mussa (2004).   11 
correction of current global imbalances will also require a decline in Europe’s and 
Japan’s savings rates and/or an increase in their investment rates. 
II.3  The U.S. Current Account Deficit in International Perspective  
  How large is the U.S. recent current account deficits, from a comparative point of 
view?  And, how large is the U.S. net international liabilities position when compared, 
from a historical vantage, to that of other advanced countries?  In Table 3 I present data 
on the distribution of current account balances in the world economy, as well as in six 
groups of nations – Industrial, Latin America, Asia, Middle East, Africa and Eastern 
Europe – for the period 1971-2001.  As may be seen, at almost 6% of GDP the U.S. 
deficit is very large from a historical and comparative perspective.  It is in the top decile 
of deficits distribution for all industrial countries in the first thirty years of floating.  As 
the data in Table 3 suggest the U.S. looks more like a Latin American or Asian country, 
than like an industrial nation.   
Since 1971 the U.S. has been the only large industrial country that has run current 
account deficits in excess of 5%.  This reflects the unique position that the U.S. has in the 
international financial system, where its assets have been in high demand, allowing it to 
run high and persistent deficits.  On the other hand, this fact also suggests that the U.S. is 
moving into uncharted waters.  As Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004), among others, have 
pointed out, if the deficit continues at its current level, in twenty five years the U.S. net 
international liabilities will surpass the levels observed by any country in modern times.   
During the last 30 years only small industrial countries have had current account 
deficits in excess of 5% of GDP: Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Malta, New Zealand, Norway and Portugal.  What is even more striking is that 
very few countries – either industrial or emerging -- have had high current account 
deficits that last for more than five years.  In Table 4 I present a list of countries with 
persistently high current account deficits for 1970-2001.  In constructing this table I 
define a country as having a “High Deficit” if, in a particular year, its current account 
deficit is higher than its region’s ninth decile.
14  I then defined a persistently high deficit 
country, as a country with a “High Deficit” (as defined above) for at least 5 consecutive 
                                                 
14   Notice that the thresholds for defining High deficits are year and region-specific.  That is, for every year 
there is a different threshold for each region.   12 
years.
15  As may be seen in Table 4 the list of persistently high deficit countries is 
extremely short, and none of these countries is large.  This illustrates the fact that, 
historically, periods of high current account imbalances have tended to be short lived, and 
have been followed by periods of current account adjustments.   
  In Table 5 I present data on net international liabilities as a percentage of GDP for 
a group of advanced countries that have historically had a large negative NIIP position.
16  
As may be seen, the picture that emerges from this table is different than that in Table 4 
on current account deficits.  Indeed, a number of advanced nations have had – and 
continue to have – a significantly larger net international liabilities position than the U.S.  
This suggests that, at least in principle, the U.S. NIIP could continue to deteriorate for 
some time into the future.  But even if this does happen, at some point this process would 
have to come to an end, and the U.S. net international liabilities position as percentage of 
GDP would have to stabilize.  It makes a big difference, however, at what level U.S. net 
international liabilities do stabilize.  For example, if in the steady state foreigners are 
willing to hold the equivalent of 35% of U.S. GDP in the form of net U.S. assets, the U.S. 
could sustain a current account deficit of (only) 2.1% of GDP.
17  If, on the other hand, 
foreigners’ net demand for U.S. assets grows to 60% of GDP – which, as shown in Table 
5, is approximately the level of (net) foreign holdings of Australian assets --, the U.S. 
sustainable current account deficit is 3.6% of GDP.  And if foreigners’ are willing to hold 
(net) U.S. assets for the equivalent of 100% of GDP – a figure that Mussa (2004) 
considers to be implausible – the sustainable U.S. current account deficit can be as high 
as 6% of GDP – approximately its current level.   
Since there are no historical precedents for a large advanced nation running 
persistently large deficits, it is extremely difficult to have a clear idea on what will be the 
actual evolution of foreigners’ demand for U.S. assets.  Give this lack of historical 
precedent, a reasonable strategy is to ask what would happen to the current account and 
                                                 
15   For an econometric analysis of current account deficits persistence see Edwards (2004).  See also 
Taylor (2002). 
16   For the U.S. the data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  For the other countries the data are, 
until 1997, from the Lane and Milessi-Ferreti data set. I have updated them using current account balance 
data.  Notice that the updated figures should be interpreted with a grain of salt, as I have not corrected them 
for valuation effects. 
17   This calculation assumes a 6% rate of growth of nominal GDP going forward.  See subsection III for an 
analytical discussion and for the relevant equations.   13 
real exchange rate dynamics if, as posited by Dooley et al (2004a) among others, 
foreigners’ demand for U.S. assets continues to increase.  This is precisely approached I 
follow in Section III of this paper.  
III.  The Analytics of Current Account and Real Exchange Rate Adjustment  
  The current account and the (real) exchange rate are endogenous variables jointly 
determined in a general equilibrium context.  This means that from a policy point of view 
the key question is how will these two variables move as a result of a given exogenous 
shock – a decline in capital inflows, say --, under the assumption that other variables, 
including growth and the rate of unemployment, do not deviate significantly from their 
long term equilibrium paths.  A number of authors have recently addressed this issue 
using a variety of simulation and econometric models.  Most of these studies have asked 
what is the real exchange rate adjustment “required” to achieve a certain current account 
balance.  Some authors, such as Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 2004) and Blanchard, 
Giavazzi and Sa (2005), have considered the case where the deficit is competently 
eliminated.   Others, including Mussa (2004) and Roubini and Setser (2004), have 
considered the reduction of the deficit to a positive, but smaller than current, level.  In 
Table 6 I provide a summary of selected studies on the subject.  As may be seen, these 
works use different methodologies, and reach different conclusions.
18  What they do have 
in common, however, is that they find “required” adjustments in the trade-weighted value 
of the U.S. dollar is quite high – according to Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa (2005) as high 
as 90%.  Interestingly, the estimated figures for “required” dollar depreciation 
summarized in Table 6 are much higher than the figures discussed in most investment 




III.1 A Portfolio Model of the Current Account and the Real Exchange Rate 
  From an analytical perspective the process of current account adjustment may be 
deconstructed into two components:  (a) The dynamics of net international foreign assets; 
and (b) the “transfer” associated with changes in a country’s net foreign assets position.  
                                                 
18   See also the studies by Mann (2003, 2004), where she extends her pioneering 1999 model. 
19   While practitioners’ do believe that the dollar will weaken, they tend to consider more moderate 
adjustments.  See, for example, the forex publications of major investment banks.    14 
Changes in international investors’ willingness to hold U.S. assets will affect total 
absorption and relative prices, including the real exchange rate.  An increase in 
foreigner’s rate of accumulation of domestic assets will allow the country to increase 
absorption, generating a current account deficit and a RER appreciation.  In a similar 
way, a reduction in the rate at which foreigners accumulate the country’s assets – or, 
worse yet, a reduction in their holdings of domestic assets -- will result in a drop in 
absorption and a decline in the relative price of nontradables, or RER depreciation.  
These changes in absorption, and the concomitant adjustment in relative prices, are 
reminiscent of discussions on the “transfer problem” that go back, at least, to the debates 
between Keynes and Ohlin during the 1920s.  In large countries such as the U.S., 
however, this story is more complex.  First, changes in relative prices have valuation 
effects on net foreign assets holdings that will feed back into the dynamics of net foreign 
assets accumulation or de-accumulation.
20   Second, in a large country changes in 
aggregate expenditure are likely to affect the international terms of trade, and thus the 
general equilibrium outcome of the original shock.   
III.1.1 The Basic Model 
  Consider the following bare bones portfolio model of the current account:
21 
Equation (1) is the basic external sector equation (in domestic currency) and states that 
the current account deficit (CAD) is equal to the trade deficit (TD), plus the income 
account (net income payments to the rest of the world) ( t ia ), plus net transfers to the rest 
of the world (NT).
22  
  (1)    t t t t NT ia TD CAD + + = , 
The income account, in turn is equal to: 




t t F i iD ia
* - = , 
                                                 
20   This effect has been emphasized by Lane and Milessi-Ferreti (2002, 2004a, 2004b), Tille (2003) and 
Gourinchas and Rey (2005), among others.  For a discussion of valuation effects in the context of emerging 
markets’ current account sustainability, see Edwards (2003). 
21   In order to concentrate on the problem at hand and to keep the analysis tractable, I have made a number 
of simplifications; I have made no attempt to construct a full general equilibrium model.  Recent papers 
that have constructed portfolio models of the current account include, Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa (2005), 
Edwards (1999, 2002), Gourinchas and Rey (2005) and Kraay and Ventura (2002).  
22   Notice that I have defined the deficit as a positive number.  In equation (1), then, negative numbers refer 
to a surplus.   15 
where i is the interest rate paid on (gross) domestic assets in hand of foreigners 
f
t D , 
and
* i is the interest rate on (gross) foreign assets held by domestic residents 
d
t F .  Since 




t F E F = .  
Where E is the nominal exchange rate defined as units of domestic currency (U.S. 
dollars) per unit of foreign currency, and 
* d
t F denotes (gross) foreign assets held by 
domestic residents, expressed in foreign currency.   Equation (1) can then be rewritten as 
follows: 
(1’)    t
d
t t t NT F i i i TD CAD + - + + = ) (
* d . 
Whered are net domestic assets in hands of foreigners ) (
d f
t F D - = d .  The terms 
t id and 
d F i i ) (
* - capture the effect of valuation effects on the current account, recently 
emphasized by a number of authors including Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2004), and 
Gourinchas and Rey (2005), among others.   
Equation (2) is a portfolio equation that summarizes the net international demand 
for the country’s assets t d .  Domestic and foreign assets are assumed to be imperfect 
substitutes.  a   is the percentage of foreigners’ wealth that international investors are 
willing to hold in the form of the domestic country’s assets; W is world’s wealth and 
c W  
is the domestic country’s wealth.   jj a  is the domestic country’s asset allocation on its 
own assets.  I assume that there is “home-bias” in portfolio decisions; this is reflected in 
the fact that  j a and  ) 1 ( jj a - are below international market shares of domestic and 
foreign wealth.  There is no need, however, to assume that foreign and domestic investors 
have the same degree of home bias.   




t t t W W W a a d - - - =  
 
 
An important question is what determines the asset allocation shares a and  jj a .  Under 
standard portfolio theory, a and  jj a will depend on expected real returns (i and i*),   16 
perceived risk (
* ,m m ), and the degree of segmentation of international financial markets 
(Equation (3)).   
(3)    ) , ( m a a i = ;   ) , (
* * m a a i jj jj = . 
In this paper, however, I make the simplifying assumption that foreign and domestic 
assets have zero substitutability.  This is equivalent to assuming that a and  jj a are 
exogenously determined, and not affected by i or 
* i .  This assumption allows me to 
focus on the effects of exogenous changes in portfolio allocation on net assets dynamics 
and the current account.  However, in subsection III.2.2 I discuss the way in which the 
results will be altered if some degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign 
assets is allowed.   
World wealth in foreign currency 
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is the expected rate of depreciation of 
the domestic currency,  and k is a term that captures the effect of capital controls; in a 
world of full capital mobility,  0 = k .   It is important to notice that in this model the term 
“investors’” refers both to private and public investors, and include foreign central banks.  
Indeed, and as pointed out in the preceding section, recent discussions on the U.S. current 
account deficit have emphasized the key role played by foreign (and especially Asian) 
central banks in helping finance the deficit. 
The counterpart of a current account deficit CAD is the change in the country’s 
(net) assets in hand of foreigners: 
(4)    t t CAD d D = . 
Equation (5) defines the trade deficit.   




i t x p m p TD ￿ ￿ - = . 
m
i p and 
x
i p are prices of importable and exportables in domestic currency.   i m is the 
demand for importables, which is assumed to depend on the real exchange rate (e), the 
international price of importable goods, the country’s real income (y), and other factors,   17 
including the degree of protectionism (v).  Exports, on the other hand, depend on the real 
exchange rate, the international price of exportables, the rest of the world real income 
(y*) and other factors (u).    
(6)    ) , , ( v y e m m i i = ;    ) *, , ( u y e x x i i = . 
i m and  i x , in turn, may be interpreted as excess demand (supply) for importable 
(exportables), in the domestic country.  In the basic version of the model it is assumed 









i Ep p Ep p = = .  
In the simulation exercises alternative assumptions can be made, however, including that 
exporters and importers price to market.  Equation (7) is the equilibrium condition for the 
nontradable goods market in the home country, where 
N
t S is the supply of nontradables in 
period t, assumed to depend on the real exchange rate and other factors z, and 
N
t D is the 
demand for nontradables: 




t y e D z e S = . 
The domestic price level P is assumed to be a geometric average of the nominal prices of 
tradable goods (importables and exportables) and nontradables: 
. ) ( ) ( ) (





t t p p p P
- - =  Equation (8) is the real exchange rate. 






e = , 
where, 
*
t P is the foreign country price level.  As before, an increase in e represents a real 
appreciation; a decrease in e is a real depreciation. 
  The working of this model is simple.  The domestic country can only run a current 
account deficit to the extent that foreign investors are willing to increase their net 
holdings of domestic assets – that is, to the extent that  . 0 > D t d  Once  t d D is known, and 
for given values of other key variables, it is possible to derive the real exchange rate (e) 
consistent with the prevailing current account deficit (surplus).  A particularly interesting 
exercise, given the current U.S. situation, is to analyze how changes in portfolio 
preferences – that is, changes in a and/or  jj a --, will affect the current account and the 
real exchange rate.   18 
  In order to close the model, it is necessary to specify a number of clearing 
conditions, including the savings and investment equations in the world economy; and 
the world clearing conditions for each importable and exportable good.  These 
equilibrium conditions determine endogenously interest rates, and all relevant tradable 
goods’ prices.  Doing this, however, would make the model significantly more complex 
than what is required for dealing with the problem at hand.  For this reason, instead of 
solving the full model, I work with a partial equilibrium version of it; in the simulations 
that follow I make different assumptions regarding these variables’ behavior.
23    
Before continuing, however, it is important to emphasize that current account 
adjustments will not only imply changes in the real exchange rate; they will also require 
changes in savings and investments in the home country (the U.S.) and the rest of the 
world.  From a policy perspective these adjustments in domestic savings would be greatly 
facilitated by an increase in public sector savings. 
III.1.2 Portfolio Equilibrium, Dynamics and Current Account Sustainability 
External sustainability requires that a country’s net external liabilities stabilize at 
a level compatible with foreigners’ net demand for these claims, as specified by equation 
(2).  Assuming that the home country’s wealth is a multiplel of its (potential or full 
employment) GDP, and that its wealth is a fraction b  of world’s wealth W, it is possible 
to rewrite the (international) net demand for the country’s assets as 











q , where 
* f W is “rest of the world” wealth expressed in foreign currency.   
Denoting l a aq g )) 1 ( (
*
jj - - = , then,  .
*Y g d =   This means that in long run 
equilibrium the net international demand for the home country’s assets can be expressed 
as a proportion 
* g of its (potential or sustainable) GDP.  The determinants of this factor 
of proportionality 
* g depend on relative returns and perceived risk of country j and the 
rest of the world, as well as on the degree of integration of international financial 
markets.     
                                                 
23  Most recent models on global imbalances and the U.S. current account have used a partial equilibrium 
framework in the simulation phase.   19 
Assuming that  g  is the country’s sustainable rate of growth, and p is the 
country’s (long term) rate of inflation, the “sustainable” current account deficit to GDP 
ratio is given by: 
(9)    ) ( )) 1 ( )( (




Notice that if 0 ) 1 ( < - - jj a aq , domestic residents’ demand for foreign assets exceeds 
foreigners’ demand for home country assets.  Under these circumstances the country will 
have to run a current account surplus in order to maintain a stable net external assets’ to 
GDP ratio.  Most authors that have studied the sustainability of the U.S. current account 
have used equations of the type of (9) in their analyses.  Mussa (2004), for example, 
argues that in long term equilibrium 
* g is likely to be around 0.50.
 24  In long run 
equilibrium the sustainable trade balance will be given by 
*   ) ( g r g
Y
TD
- = . 
  In this model, as in the models by Edwards (1999) and Kraay and Ventura (2002), 
additional savings will be allocated in a way that maintains domestic and foreign assets in 
the same proportion as in the original portfolio.  Kraay and Ventura (2002) have shown 
that models that combine this assumption with the assumption of transaction costs in 
investment go a long way in explaining international current account behavior in a large 
number of countries.   
  If the degree of riskiness of the home country declines, there will be an increase in 
a and, thus, in
* g .  As a result, the sustainable current account deficit will increase, or the 
sustainable surplus will decline (see equation 10).  Equally important, changes in 
portfolio allocation, generated by changes in a  or  jj a , will generate a dynamic 
adjustment process, during which the current account will differ from its long run 
sustainable level.  This transitional dynamics can be incorporated into the model through 
the following equation: 
































g p k g g y g p . 
                                                 
24   See, also, Edwards (1995), Ades and Kaune (1997), and O’Neill and Hatzius (2004) for this type of 
current account sustainability analyses.   20 
According to equation (1) short term deviations of the current account from its long run 
level can result from two forces.  The first is a traditional stock adjustment term 
) ( 1
*
- - t t g g  that captures deviations between the demanded and the actual stock of the 
country’s assets in hands of foreign investors.  y  is the speed of adjustment, which will 
depend on a number of factors, including the degree of capital mobility in the country in 





















g p k  in equation (10), is a self-correcting term.  This term plays the 
role of making sure that in this economy there is some form of “consumption 
smoothing”.  The importance of this self correcting term will depend on the value of  . k
25  
Whether the dynamic representation in equation (10) is appropriate is, in the final 
analysis, an empirical matter.  As I show in subsection III.2, below, under certain 
parametrization this model does a (very) good job in tracking the current account 
behavior in the U.S. during the last few years.  The dynamic behavior for the net stock of 
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   Consider the case where for some reason the home bias in the rest of the world is 
reduced – that is, a in the portfolio equation (3) increases.  This will result in an increase 
in the sustainable current account deficit (see equation 9).  It will also unleash a dynamic 
adjustment process captured by equation (10).  During this transitional period the current 
account deficit will exceed its new long run (higher) sustainable equilibrium; that is, 
during the transition the current account deficit will overshoot its new sustainable level.  



































) ( ) (
* * g .  From equations (5) through 
(7) -- and after making some assumptions regarding the behavior of other key variables’ 
such as the international term of trade --, the following equation for the current account 
                                                 
25   If  0 = =k y , the current account will jump from one sustainable level to the next.  There are many 
reasons to assume that both y and k are different from zero, including the existence of adjustment costs in 
consumption.   21 
may be derived (in order to simplify the notation, the  i m and  i x have been aggregated into 
broad imports and exports categories): 
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Where  m s and  x s are imports and exports to GDP ratios;  e e e h , are the price elasticities 
of imports and exports, respectively ( 0 , 0 > < e e e h ).   * , y y e h are the elasticities of 
imports and exports with respect to domestic and foreign income, respectively. 
* , g g represent real GDP growth at home and in the rest of the world; 
* ,p p is domestic 
and world inflation; 
* * ˆ , ˆ x m p p are the rates of changes in international prices of imports and 
exports, and e ˆ is the rate of change of the real exchange rate.  From this equation it 
follows that in order for a real devaluation to improve the trade balance (and, with other 
things given, the current account) it is required that  )} 1 ( ) 1 ( { e m e x h s e s + - + >0.
26   
Although equation (11) is not a reduced form equation, this model is useful for 
undertaking a number of simulation exercises.  For example, form equations (2), (4), (10) 
and (11) -- and under assumed values of growth, inflation, interest rates and international 
terms of trade changes --, it is possible to analyze the way in which changes in portfolio 
preferences will affect the current account and real exchange rate trajectories.   
III.2 Simulation Results    
  The bare bones model developed above may be used to compute the current 
account and real exchange rate adjustments consistent with shifts in portfolio preferences 
by foreign and domestic investors, including a reduction in the extent of home bias in 
portfolio investment decision.
27  A first step in this analysis is the calibration of the 
model.  In Table 7 I present the parameter values used in the base-case simulation; most 
                                                 
26  Under balanced initial trade, this expression becomes the traditional Marshall-Lerner condition. 
27 In fact, there are indications that the process of international capital markets integration will continue in 
the future, as some of the largest emerging countries – including China – are increasingly allowing their 
nationals to invest abroad.  See, for example, the Financial Times, February 28, 2005 (p.6):  “China to Seek 
Full Currency Conversion.”    22 
of these values are taken form existing studies of the U.S. and world economy.  In the 
calibration I selected the values of y and k that best tracked the actual dynamics of the 
current account between 1996 and 2004; the best results are obtained for 
30 . 0 = y and 20 . 0 = k .  I also assumed that foreigners’ demand for U.S. assets a  has 
increased gradually from 0.205 to 0.30 between 1996 and 2004 (see the values for 
Historical a , and  jjInitial a  in Table 7).  As may be seen from Figure 5.A, for the assumed 
parameter values the model tracks actual current account behavior for 1996-2004 quite 
closely.   
  One of the limitations of this type of simulation exercise is that it is difficult to 
forecast how foreign investors’ net demand for U.S. assets will behave in the future.  It is 
precisely for this reason that a number of authors have eschewed the issue, and have 
computed the RER adjustment “required” to eliminate completely the current account 
deficit.
28  In this section I take a different approach: instead of assuming that the current 
account deficit has to be reduced to zero – or to any other arbitrary number --, I analyze 
the dynamic of the current account under alternative assumptions regarding foreigner’s 
net demand for U.S. assets.  I am particularly interested in understanding what is likely to 
happen under an optimistic scenario, where foreigners’ demand for U.S. assets continues 
to grow in the future.  What makes this approach particularly interesting is that even 
under this optimistic scenario, it is highly likely that in the not too distant future the U.S. 
current account will undergo a significant reversal.   
As may be seen in Table 7.A, in these simulation exercises I assume a gradual 
portfolio in the next five years: More specifically, I assume that a increases from its 
current value of 0.30 to 0.40 by 2010; I also assume that  jj a goes from 0.73 to 0.71 
during the same period.  This adjustment implies a reduction in the extent of home bias 
both in the rest of the world and in the U.S.  In the base-case scenario the assumed 
portfolio adjustment is equivalent to foreigners’ doubling their net demand for U.S. assets 
to the equivalent of 60% of U.S. GDP.  This is a very large number.  Indeed, it implies 
                                                 
28   Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 2004).  For similar approaches see Mussa (2004) and Blanchard, Giavazzi 
and Sa (2005).   23 
that, under the assumptions of 023 . 0 , 03 . 0 = = p g , during the next five years (2005-2010) 
the U.S. NIIP would deteriorate by a further $5.72 trillion. 
Before proceeding, the following assumptions made in the base-case scenario 
deserve some comments (See Table 7 for details): (a) I have assumed that the U.S. and 
the rest of the world grow at the same rate  ) (
* g g = .  Implicit in this assumption is the 
idea that while the U.S. will grow faster than Europe and Japan, the rest of the world – 
including China and India – will continue to grow at very rapid rates.  In a number of 
alternative simulations I considered different values for growth.  (b) The values of the 
key elasticities have been taken from existing studies on the U.S. and global economies.
29  
These values reflect two important characteristics about these elasticities: the income 
elasticity for U.S. imports is higher than that for rest of the world imports (the so-called 
Houthakker-Magee effect), and the real exchange rate elasticity of U.S. imports exceeds 
(in absolute terms) the real exchange rate elasticity of exports by a magnitude of 3.  
Finally, it is worth noting that in the base case scenario I assumed that the adjustment had 
no effect on the international terms of trade ) 0 ˆ ˆ (
* * = = x m p p ; in alternative simulations, 
however, I considered that case where there are changes in the terms of trade.  
The results obtained from this base-case exercise are presented in Figure 5.  In 
these simulations period 8 should be interpreted as “the initial period”; the shaded area 
represents recent history.  Panel A depicts the current account deficit (for the first few 
years the actual deficit is also presented); Panel B presents the trade deficit; Panel C 
presents the evolution of net U.S. assets in hands of foreigners, as a percentage of U.S. 
GDP; and Panel D contains the simulation for the trade-weighted U.S. RER index.  The 
most salient features of the base-case simulation may be summarized as follows: 
  
·  Under the (deliberately) optimistic assumption of a further increase in 
foreigners’ net demand for U.S. assets, the deficit continues to increase 
during the next four years, until it peaks at 7.3% of GDP.  From that 
point onwards the deficit declines towards its new steady state of 3.18% 
of GDP. 
                                                 
29   See Hooper, Johnson and Marquez (2001).   24 
·  Once the deficit reaches its peak, the current account reversal is quite 
sharp.  According to the base-case scenario, during the first three years 
of adjustment the current account is reduced by 3.2% of GDP.  The 
reversal of the trade deficit is even sharper.  The reason for this is that 
with a higher net debtor position, net payments (interest and dividends) 
to foreign investors increase significantly, relative to GDP. 
·  As may be seen from Panel D, once the process of current account 
reversal begins, the trade-weighted RER index experiences a rapid (real) 
depreciation.  During the first three first yeas of the adjustment the 
accumulated real depreciation is 21.3%.  By the time the new sustainable 
current account deficit is reached, the accumulated depreciation of the 
trade-weighted RER index amounts to 28%.  This result is roughly in 
line with other studies on the subject (See Table 6 for details on other 
studies).  It should be noted that these simulations incorporate the 
valuation effect of dollar depreciation on the U.S. net foreign asset 
position.  If the valuation effect is ignored, the resulting real depreciation 
is larger.  For example, in the first three years of the adjustment the 
accumulated depreciation is 28.3%.   
 
Naturally, these simulation results depend on the assumptions summarized in 
Table 7.  Alternative assumptions regarding growth, inflation, interest rates, terms of 
trade, elasticities and other key parameters will affect the quantitative aspect of the 
simulations.  To the extent that the changes in the assumptions are not extreme, however, 
the main qualitative result holds: even under a (very) optimistic assumption regarding 
foreigners’ net demand for U.S. assets, the current account deficit is likely to go through 
a large reversal in the not too distant future. 
An important question is how sensitive are these results to portfolio choices.  In 
order to explore this issue, in Figure 6 I report results from a simulation exercise 
(Simulation B) that assumes that after increasing their net holdings of U.S. assets to 60% 
of U.S. GDP by the year 2010, foreign investors make a new portfolio adjustment, and 
gradually reduce their desired holdings of U.S. assets to “only” 50% of GDP by 2010.    25 
As may be seen from Figure 6, in this case the current account reversal is significantly 
more abrupt, as is the depreciation of the trade-weighted RER index.  In the first three 
years of the adjustment the current account deficit declines by 5.3% of GDP, and the 
accumulated depreciation is 28.8%.  Moreover, as may be seen in Figure 6.D, by the third 
year of the adjustment (period 15 in the simulation) the trade balance has turned into a 
trade surplus.  It is important to keep in mind that this simulation still assumes that the 
long run net demand by foreigners for U.S. assets is still significantly higher – 20% of 
GDP higher, to be more precise – than its current level.  Due to space considerations, I 
have not presented the results from “pessimistic” scenarios, where foreigners’ reduce 
their net demand for U.S. assets below the current level.  Suffice is to say that under that 
scenario the current account reversal is even more pronounced, as is the concomitant real 
depreciation. 
The results in Figures 5 and 6, -- and in particular the abrupt current account 
reversal that takes place after a peak deficit is reached -- depend on the assumptions made 
on parameters y and k ; different values of these parameters would result in different 
dynamics.  More specifically, a very large value of y , coupled with a very low value of 
k would result in a more gradual convergence of the current account deficit to its new 
sustainable level.  It should be noticed, however, that in this case the build-up of the 
deficit is also very gradual, and does not track the actual experience of the U.S. since the 
mid-1990s.  Indeed, the values of y and k used in the simulations are those that provide a 
better representation of the U.S. recent history.  
  The simulations discussed above have assumed an exogenously given rate of 
growth of GDP.  This, of course, needs not be the case.  It is likely, in fact, that current 
account reversals of the type and magnitude suggested by the simulation results will have 
an effect on real economic activity, including growth.
30  In Section IV of this paper I use 
a new comparative cross country data set to investigate the real consequences of current 
account reversals in the world economy since 1971.  This comparative analysis will be 
useful to get some idea on the possible effects of a potential U.S. current account 
reversal, similar to that in the simulations in Figures 5 and 6.  
                                                 
30   See the pioneering study on current account reversals by Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000).  See, also, 
Edwards (2004).    26 
IV.  How Costly are Current Account Reversals? An International 
Comparative Analysis 
The main message from the simulation exercises presented in the preceding 
section is that, even under very optimistic scenarios where foreigners’ demand for U.S. 
assets increases significantly, it is very likely that the U.S. current account will 
experience a significant reversal in the not too distant future.  A key question is what will 
be the nature of this adjustment process?  In this section I address this issue by analyzing 
the international experience with current account reversals in the period 1971-2001.  
Although the U.S. case is unique – both because of the size of its economy and because 
the dollar is the main vehicle currency in the world –, an analysis of the international 
experience will provide some light on the likely nature of the adjustment.  A particularly 
important question is whether this adjustment will entail real costs in the form of lower 
growth and higher unemployment.  Previous studies on the subject have generated 
conflicting results: after analyzing the evidence from a large number of countries, Milesi-
Ferreti and Razin (2000) concluded that major current account reversals have not been 
costly.  According to them, “reversals… are not systematically associated with a growth 
slowdown (p. 303).”  Frankel and Cavallo (2004), on the other hand, concluded that 
sudden stops of capital inflows (a phenomenon closely related to reversals) have resulted 
in growth slowdown.    
In what follows I analyze several aspects of current account reversals, including:
31 
·  Incidence of current account reversals. 
·  Relationship between reversals and sudden stops of capital inflows. 
·  The relation between current account reversals and exchange rate 
depreciation. 
·  The factors determining the probability of a country experiencing a current 
account reversal. 
·  The costs – in terms of growth slowdown – of current account reversals. 
 
                                                 
31  In Edwards (2004) I used a smaller data set to investigate reversals in emerging countries.  In that paper, 
however, I did not consider the experience of large or industrial countries with reversals.  Also, in that 
paper I used very simple framework for analyzing growth.  In contrast, in this section I use a two steps 
dynamic of growth approach.      27 
In analyzing these issues I rely on two complementary statistical approaches: 
First, I use non-parametric tests to analyze the incidence and main characteristics of 
current account reversals.  And second, I use panel regression-based analyses to estimate 
the probability of experiencing a current account reversal, and the cost of such reversal, 
in terms of short-term declines in output growth.  Although the data set covers all regions 
in the world, in the discussion presented in this section, and in an effort to shed light on 
the U.S. case, I emphasize the experience of large countries. 
IV.1 Current Account Reversals during 1971-2001:  The International Evidence   
I use two definitions of current account reversals:  (a) Reversal I is defined as a 
reduction in the current account deficit of at least 6% of GDP in a three-year period.  (b) 
Reversal II is defined as a reduction in the current account deficit of at least 4% of GDP 
in one year. 
32  In Reversal I the magnitude of the adjustment is more pronounced, but is 
distributed over a longer number of years than under the Reversal I definition.
33  In Table 
8 I present data on the incidence for both definitions of current account reversals for the 
complete sample as well as for the six groups of countries considered in Section III.  As 
may be seen, for the overall sample the incidence of reversals is 9.2% and 11.8%, for 
Reversals I and II, respectively.  The incidence of reversals among the industrial 
countries is much smaller however, at 2.7% and 2.0% for Reversals I and II.  Indeed, the 
Pearson-￿
2 and F-tests reported in Table 8 indicate that the hypothesis of equal incidence 
of reversals across regions is rejected strongly.   
The advanced countries that have experienced current account Reversals I are:  
Finland (1978, 1994), Greece (1988), Ireland (1984), New Zealand (1977-78, 1988-89), 
Norway (1979-80, 1989, 2000) and Portugal (1979, 1984-85).  The advanced countries 
that have experienced current account Reversals II are: Austria (1982), Canada (1982), 
Greece (1986), Iceland (1983, 1986), Ireland (1975), Italy (1975), Malta (1997), New 
Zealand (1978), Norway (1989), and Portugal (1982-83, 1985).  With the exception of 
                                                 
32  In both cases the timing of the reversal is recorded as the year when the episode
 ends.  That is if a 
country reduces its current account deficit by 7% of GDP between 1980 and 1982, the episode is recorded 
has having taken place in 1982.  Also, for a particular episode to classify as a current account deficit 
reversal, the initial balance has to be indeed a deficit.  Notice that these definitions are somewhat different 
from those used in other studies, including Freund (2000), Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000), Edwards (2002) 
and Guidotti et al (2003). 
33 Notice that it is possible for a country to have experienced both a Reversal I and II during a same 
historical episode.   28 
Italy and Canada, all of these countries are very small, underlying the point that there are 
no historical precedents of large countries undergoing profound current account 
adjustments.  As pointed out above, this implies that the results reported here on current 
account reversals should be interpreted with a grain of salt, and should not be 
mechanically extended to the case of the U.S. 
The analysis presented above has distinguished countries by their stage of 
development and geographical location.  An alternative way of dividing the sample – and 
one that is particularly relevant for the discussion of possible lessons for the U.S. – is by 
country size.  I define “large countries” as those having a GDP in the top 25% of the 
distribution (according to this criterion there are 44 “large” countries in the sample).  The 
incidence of Reversals I among “large” countries is 3.6% for 1971-2001; the incidence of 
Reversals II among “large” countries is 5.9%.   
 
IV.1.1 Current Account Reversals and Sudden Stops of Capital Inflows 
In the last few years a number of authors have analyzed episodes of sudden stops 
of capital inflows into a country.
34  From an analytical perspective sudden stops and 
current account reversals should be highly related phenomena. There is no reason, 
however, for their relationship to be one-to-one.  Indeed, because of changes in 
international reserves, it is perfectly possible that a country that suffers a sudden stop 
does not experience, at the same time, a current account reversal.   However, in countries 
with floating exchange rates changes in international reserves tend to be relatively small 
and, at least in principle, the relation between sudden stops and reversals should be 
stronger.   
In order to investigate formally the relation between these two phenomena I 
defined a “sudden stop” episode as an abrupt and major reduction in capital inflows to a 
country that up to that time had been receiving large volumes of foreign capital.  More 
specifically, I imposed the following requirements for an episode to qualify as a “sudden 
stop”:  (1) the country in question must have received an inflow of capital (relative to 
GDP) larger than its region’s third quartile during the two years prior to the “sudden 
                                                 
34  See Calvo et al (2004), Edwards (2004b).   29 
stop.”  And (2), net capital inflows must have declined by at least 5% of GDP in one 
year.
35   
In Table 9 I present a table for the “sudden stops” and the current account deficit 
reversal (I use both definitions of reversal), for three samples:  (a) large countries, defined 
as those countries that whose GDP is  in the top quartile of the distribution; (b) industrial 
countries; and (c) the complete sample.  Table 9 shows that for the complete sample, 
21.1% of countries subject to a sudden stop also faced a Type I current account reversal.  
At the same time, 15.0% of those with Reversals I also experienced (in the same year) a 
sudden stop of capital inflows.  Panel C shows that 51% of countries subject to a sudden 
stop faced a current account reversal II.  Also, 26.7% of those with Reversals II 
experienced (in the same year) a sudden stop of capital inflows.  The ￿
2 tests indicate that 
in both cases the hypothesis of independence between reversals and sudden stops is 
rejected.  The data for the industrial countries show that the joint incidence of Reversals I 
and Sudden Stops is rather low.  In fact, according to the ￿
2 test the null hypothesis of 
independence between the two phenomena cannot be rejected.  The relation between 
sudden stops and Reversals II is somewhat higher for industrial countries: the hypothesis 
of independence is rejected (￿
2=23.6; p=0.00).  The results for “large countries” are 
similar to that for industrial countries. 
An analysis of the lead-lag structure of reversals and sudden stops suggest that 
sudden stops tend to occur either before or at the same time – that is, during the same 
year – as current account reversals.  Indeed, according to a series of non-parametric ￿
2 
tests it is possible to reject the hypothesis that current account reversals precede sudden 
stops. 
IV.2 Current Account Reversals and the Exchange Rate 
  An important policy question – and one that is particularly relevant within the 
context of current policy debate in the U.S. – is whether current account reversals have 
historically been associated with unusually large exchange rate depreciations.  The 
starting point for this analysis is the construction of an index of “external pressures” 
along the lines suggested by Eichengreen et al (1996):   
                                                 
35 In order to check for the robustness of the results, I also used two alternative definitions of sudden stops, 
which considered a reduction in inflows of 3 and 7 of GDP in one year.  Due to space considerations, 
however, I don’t report detailed results using these definitions.   30 
(12)    ) / ( * ) / ( / R R E E I R E t D - D = s s .   
Where ( E E / D ) is the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate, and ( R R/ D ) is the 
rate of change of international reserves.   E s  is the standard deviation of changes in 
exchange rates, and  R s is the standard deviation of changes in international reserves.  
Traditional analyses define a crisis ( t C ) to have taken place when the index in equation 
(12) exceeds the mean of the index plus k standard deviations.  The crisis indicator  t C  
takes a value of one (crisis) or zero (no crisis) according to the following rule:
36 
(13)    
otherwise













Based on equation (13), I define two currency crisis indicators: (a) Currency Crisis A: 
This is the traditional crises index. C t takes the value of one if  t I exceeds its mean by 3 
times its standard deviation (that is, k=3 in equation 13).  (b) Currency Crisis B:   In this 
case it is the nominal exchange rate by itself that triggers the C t crisis indicator.  In this 
case the country experiences a large exchange rate depreciation without a major loss in 
international reserves.  This indicator is more relevant for the case of floating exchange 
rate countries, where changes in international reserves are minimal. 
  I computed a number of two-way frequency tables and both definitions of crisis 
and of current account reversals.  I also calculated ￿
2 tests for independence of occurrence 
of these phenomena.  In Table 10 I present data on the percentage of current account 
reversals that also correspond to crises.  The results are for three samples: large countries, 
industrial countries, and all countries.  As above, I have defined “large countries” as 
having a GDP in the top 25% of the distribution.
37  The results obtained suggest that 
historically there have been a number of cases where current account reversals and 
currency crisis have occurred jointly.  Consider, for example, the case of Currency Crises 
A and Reversals I for the large countries sample:  34.6% of countries with reversals 
                                                 
36 The pioneer work here is Eichnegreen et al (1996), who suggested that the index (12) also included 
changes in domestic interest rates.  The original index, however, has limited use in broad comparative 
analyses; the reason for this is that most emerging and transition economies don’t have long time series on 
interest rates.  For this reason, most empirical analyses are based on a restricted version of the index, such 
as 2. 
37  Data on the percentage of crises that also correspond to reversals are available on request.  The results of 
the ￿
2 tests confirm those discussed above.   31 
experienced a contemporaneous currency crisis; 46.4% experienced a crisis in the second 
year of the reversal episode; and 28.6% of the reversals experienced a type A currency 
crisis in the third (and final) year of the reversal episode.  For the case of industrial 
countries the data in Table 10 shows that countries with reversals tended to experience 
currency crises during the initial year of the reversal episode.  As may be seen from Table 
10, the p-values for the ￿
2 tests indicate that, in most cases, the null hypothesis that 
current account reversals and currency crises are independent from each other is rejected 
at conventional levels.  Even though these tests don’t imply causality, they do provide 
evidence indicating that historically countries that have gone through major current 
account reversals have tended to also experience currency crises. 
  In Table 11 I present data on the distribution of exchange rate changes for Type I 
current account reversal countries.
38  Panel A contains data on the nominal exchange rate 
(relative to the U.S. dollar); Panel B is for the (trade-weighted) real exchange rate.  These 
changes are calculated as the accumulated exchange rate change in the period comprised 
between the year of the reversal and three years before the reversal. In Panel A a positive 
number indicates a nominal depreciation.  For comparison purposes I have also included 
the distribution of three year nominal exchange rate changes for a control group of 
countries that have not experienced a current account reversal.  The results in Table 11.A, 
indicate that reversal countries have tended to experience significantly larger nominal 
depreciations than the control group of countries.  Consider, for example, the case of 
large countries:  the average depreciation for the reversal episodes – the “treatment” 
column -- is 28%; it is only 9.2 for the control group of countries.  In order to test 
formally whether nominal exchange rate changes behaved differently in reversal and 
control group countries, I estimated a series of non parametric Kruskal-Wallis c
2 tests on 
the equality of the distribution of the accumulated depreciation.  The null hypothesis is 
that the data from the reversal countries and from the control group have been drawn 
from the same population.  As may be seen from Table 11, in the vast majority of cases 
the null hypothesis is rejected at conventional levels. 
                                                 
38  Data on Reversal II countries are not presented due to space considerations.  The results, however, are 
similar to those reported here, and are available on request.     32 
  Table 11.B present data for the accumulated change in the RER for the reversal 
countries and the control group of countries.   The results indicate that large countries 
experienced a rather small real depreciation (3.1%) in the period surrounding the current 
account adjustment.  The magnitude of the average RER depreciation is, however, 
statistically larger than the average depreciation for the control group (See the p-value for 
the ￿
2 test).  The same is true for the “all countries” sample.  Surprisingly, perhaps, for 
the industrial countries the accumulated average change in the RER is an appreciation. 
  The average accumulated depreciations (both nominal and real) in the reversal 
countries reported in Table 11 are relatively small when compared with the “required” 
exchange rate depreciation that has been calculated in a number of studies, including in 
the simulations reported in Section III of this paper.  Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004), for 
example, estimate that eliminating the U.S. current account deficit would imply a (real) 
depreciation of between 16 and 36 percent.  Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa (2005) have 
estimated a required depreciation of the U.S. trade weighted dollar in the range of 40% to 
90%.   There are many possible reasons for these differences, including that the U.S is a 
very large country, while the countries that have experienced reversals are much smaller.  
Also, the values of elasticities and other parameters may be different in the U.S. than in 
the average reversal country. Yet another possibility has to do with the level of economic 
activity and aggregate demand.  Most recent models on the U.S. current account assume 
that the economy stays in a “full employment” path.  It is possible, however, that the 
countries that have historically experienced reversals have also gone through economic 
slowdowns, and that a reduction in aggregate demand contributed to the adjustment 
effort. 
IV.3 The Probability of Experiencing Current Account Reversals 
In order to understand further the forces behind current account reversals I 
estimated a number of panel equations on the probability of experiencing a reversal.  The 
empirical model is given by equations (14) and (15): 
 
 
   33 
1,    if   , 0
* > tj r  
(14)    tj r         =       
        0,  otherwise.    
(15)   
*
tj r    =     tj tj e aw + . 
Variable  jt r is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if country j in period t 
experienced a current account reversal, and zero if the country did not experience  a 
reversal.  According to equation (15), whether the country experiences a current account 
reversal is assumed to be the result of an unobserved latent variable
*
tj r .  
*
tj r , in turn, is 
assumed to depend linearly on vector tj w .  The error term  tj e is given by given by a 
variance component model:   . tj j tj m n e + =    j n is iid with zero mean and variance
2
n s ; 
tj m is normally distributed with zero mean and variance  1
2 = m s .  The data set used covers 
87 countries, for the 1970-2000 period; not every country has data for every year, 
however.  See the Data Appendix for exact data definition and data sources.   
In determining the specification of this probit model I followed the literature on 
external crises, and I included the following covariates:
39 (a) The ratio of the current 
account deficit to GDP lagged one period.  (b) A sudden stop dummy that takes the value 
of one if the country in question experienced a sudden stop in the previous year.  (c) An 
index that measures the relative occurrence of sudden stops in the country’s region 
(excluding the country itself) during that particular year.  This variable captures the effect 
of “regional contagion.”  (d) The one-year lagged gross external debt over GDP ratio.  
Ideally one would want to have the net debt; however, there most countries there are no 
data on net liabilities.  (e) The one-year lagged rate of growth of domestic credit.  (f) The 
lagged ratio of the country’s fiscal deficit relative to GDP.  (g) The country’s initial GDP 
per capita (in logs).  
The results obtained from the estimation of this variance-component probit model 
for a sample of large countries are presented in Table 12; as before, I have defined 
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“large” as having a GDP in the top 25% of its distribution.  The results obtained are quite 
satisfactory; the vast majority of coefficients have the expected sign, and most of them 
are significant at conventional levels.  The results may be summarized as follows:  Larger 
(lagged) current account deficits increase the probability of a reversal, as does a (lagged) 
sudden stop of capital inflows.  Countries with higher GDP per capita have a lower 
probability of a reversal.  The results do not provide strong support for the contagion 
hypothesis: the variable that measures the incidence of sudden stops in the county’s 
region is significant in only one of the equations (its sign is always positive, however).  
There is also evidence that an increase in a country’s (gross) external debt increases the 
probability of reversals.  The results also indicate that higher public sector deficits result 
in an increase in the probability of a Reversal II.  Countries with looser monetary policy 
also have had a higher probability of experiencing a reversal.  Although, the U.S. is a 
very special case the results reported in Table 12 provide some support to the idea that 
during the last few years the probability of the U.S. experiencing a reversal has increased:  
indeed, the U.S. has experienced steady increases in some important determinants of 
reversals, such as its (gross) international debt, its fiscal deficit and its current account 
deficit. 
IV.4 Current Account Reversals and Growth 
In this subsection I investigate the relation between current account reversals and 
real economic performance.  I am particularly interested in analyzing in analyzing the 
following issues:  (a) historically, have abrupt current account adjustments had an effect 
on GDP growth?  (b) Have sudden stops and current account reversals had the same 
impact on growth?  And (c), have the effects of reversals depend on the structural 
characteristics of the country in question, including its economic size (i.e. whether it is a 
large country), its degree of trade openness and the extent to which it restricts capital 
mobility.  In addressing these issues I emphasize the case of large countries; as a 
comparison, however, I do provide results for the complete sample of large and small 
countries. 
Authors that have analyzed the real effects of current account reversals have 
reached different conclusions.  Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000), for example, used both 
before–and-after analyses as well as cross-country regressions to deal with this issue and   35 
concluded that “reversal events seem to entail substantial changes in macroeconomic 
performance between the period before and the period after the crisis but are not 
systematically associated with a growth slowdown (p. 303, emphasis added).”  Edwards 
(2002), on the other hand, used dynamic panel regression analysis and concluded that 
major current account reversals had a negative effect on investment, and that they had “a 
negative effect on GDP per capita growth, even after controlling for investment (p. 
52).”
40 
IV.4.1  Growth Effects of Current Account Reversals and Sudden Stops: An Econometric 
Model  
The point of departure of the empirical analysis is a two-equation formulation for 
the dynamics of real GDP per capita growth of country j in period t. Equation (16) is the 
long run GDP growth equation; equation (17), on the other hand, captures the growth 
dynamics process. 
(16)     j j j t r x g w q b a + + + = ~ . 
(17)      jt jt jt jt j jt u v g g g e g j l + + + - = D - ] ~ [ 1 .    
I have used the following notation:  j g ~  is the long run rate of real per capita GDP 
growth in country j;  j x is a vector of structural, institutional and policy variables that 
determine long run growth;  j r is a vector of regional dummies; a, b and q are parameters, 
and  j w is an error term assumed to be heteroskedastic. In equation (17),  jt g is the rate of 
growth of per capita GDP in country j in period t. The terms  jt v and  jt u are shocks, 
assumed to have zero mean, finite variance and to be uncorrelated among them. More 
specifically,  jt v is assumed to be an external terms of trade shock, while  jt u captures 
other shocks, including current account reversals and sudden stops of capital inflows.  jt e  
is an error term, which is assumed to have a variance component form, and l, j, and  g 
are parameters that determine the particular characteristics of the growth process.  
Equation (17) has the form of an equilibrium correction model and states that the actual 
                                                 
40 In a recent paper, Guidotti et al (2003) consider the role of openness in an analysis of imports and exports 
behavior in the aftermath of a reversal.  See also Frankel and Cavallo (2005).   36 
rate of growth in period t will deviate from the long run rate of growth due to the 
existence of three types of shocks: v t j, u t j and x t j.  Over time, however, the actual rate 
of growth will tend to converge towards it long run value, with the rate of convergence 
given by l. Parameterj , in equation (17), is expected to be positive, indicating that an 
improvement in the terms of trade will result in a (temporary) acceleration in the rate of 
growth, and that negative terms of trade shock are expected to have a negative effect 
on jt g .
41  From the perspective of the current analysis, a key issue is whether current 
account reversals and sudden stops have a negative effect on growth; that is, whether 
coefficient g is significantly negative.  In the actual estimation of equation (17), I used 
dummy variables for sudden stops and reversals.  An important question – and one that is 
addressed in detail in the Subsection that follows – is whether the effects of different 
shocks on growth are different for countries with different structural characteristics, such 
as its degree of trade and capital account openness. 
Equations (16) - (17) were estimated using a two-step procedure. In the first step I 
estimate the long run growth equation (16) using a cross-country data set.  These data are 
averages for 1974-2001, and the estimation makes a correction for heteroskedasticity. 
These first stage estimates are then used to generate long-run predicted growth rates to 
replace  j g ~ in the equilibrium error correction model (17).  In the second step, I estimated 
equation (17) using GLS for unbalanced panels; I used both random effects and fixed 
effects estimation procedures.
42   The data set used covers 157 countries, for the 1970-
2000 period; not every country has data for every year, however.  See the Data Appendix 
for exact data definition and data sources.   
In estimating equation (16) for long-run per capita growth, I followed the standard 
literature on growth, as summarized by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), Sachs and 
Warner (1995) and Dollar (1992) among others.  I assume that the rate of growth of GDP 
( j g ~ ) depends on a number of structural, policy and social variables.  More specifically, I 
include the following covariates: the log of initial GDP per capita; the investment ratio; 
the coverage of secondary education, as a proxy for human capital; an index of the degree 
                                                 
41   See Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2004) for details. 
42   Due to space considerations, only the random effect results are reported.   37 
of openness of the economy; the ratio of government consumption relative to GDP; and 
regional dummies.  The results obtained from these first-step estimates are not reported 
due to space considerations. 
In Table 13 I present the results from the second step estimation of the growth 
dynamics equation (17), when random effects were used.  The results are presented for  
the “large countries” sample (Panel A), as well as for the “all countries” sample (Panel 
B).  The first two equations refer to current account reversals (Reversals I and II, 
respectively).  In the next equation I have included the sudden stops indicator instead of 
the reversal dummy.  In equations (13.4) and (13.5) I included both the sudden stops and 
the reversals variables as regressors.
43  The estimated coefficient of the growth gap is, as 
expected, positive, significant, and smaller than one.  The point estimates are on the high 
side -- between 0.71 and 0.82 --, suggesting that, on average, deviations between long run 
and actual growth get eliminated rather quickly.  For instance, according to equation 
(13.1), after 3 years approximately 85% of a unitary shock to real GDP growth per capita 
will be eliminated.  Also, as expected, the estimated coefficients of the terms of trade 
shock are always positive, and statistically significant, indicating that an improvement 
(deterioration) in the terms of trade results in an acceleration (de-acceleration) in the rate 
of growth of real per capita GDP.  As may be seen from equations (13.1) and (13.2), the 
coefficient of the current account reversals variable is significantly negative, indicating 
that reversals result in a deceleration of growth.  For large countries these results suggest 
that, on average, a Type I reversal has resulted in a reduction of GDP growth of 3.2%.  
This effect persists through time, and gets eliminated gradually as  g converges towards 
j g ~ .  In the case of Reversal II the estimated negative effect is even larger, at -4.6%.   The 
results in equation (13.3) show that countries that have experienced a sudden stop of 
capital inflows have also experienced a reduction in GDP growth – for large countries the 
point estimate is -1.5.  This is the case independently of whether the country in question 
has also suffered from a current account reversal.   In the last two equations in Table 13 I 
included both the current account reversal and sudden stops indicators.  The results 
obtained suggest that the larger costs of adjustment have been associated with current 
                                                 
43  In the analysis that follows, and in order to focus the discussion, I will concentrate on the effects of 
current account reversals.    38 
account reversals.  Take, for example, equation (13.4) for the large countries sample:  the 
coefficient of Reversal I is more than twice as large (in absolute terms) than that of 
sudden stops.  According to this equation, countries that have experienced both a reversal 
and a sudden stop experienced, on average, a decline in GDP per capita growth of 5%.  In 
equation (13.5) the coefficient of the current account reversal indicator continues to be 
significantly negative; the coefficient of sudden stops is negative but not significant.   
To summarize, the results presented in Table 13 are revealing, and provide some 
light on the costs of an eventual current account reversal in the U.S.  Historically, “large 
countries that have gone through reversals have experienced deep GDP growth 
reductions.  These estimates indicate that, on average, and with other factors given, the 
declined of GDP growth per capita has been in the range of 3.6 to 5.0 percent in the first 
year of the adjustment.  Three years after the initial adjustment GDP growth will still be 
below its long run trend. 
IV.4.2 Extensions, Endogeneity and Robustness 
  In this sub-section I discuss some extensions and deal with robustness issues, 
including the potential endogeneity bias of the estimates.  More specifically, I address the 
following issues:  (a) the role of countries structural characteristics in determining the 
costs of adjustment; (b) results from instrumental variables random effect GLS 
estimation; and (c) the effects of terms of trade changes; 
A. Openness and the Costs of Adjustment:   Recent studies on the economics of 
external adjustment have emphasized the role of trade openness.  Edwards (2004), Calvo 
et al (2004) and Frankel and Cavallo (2004), among others, have found that countries that 
are more open to international trade tend to incur in a lower cost of adjustment.  These 
studies, however, have not made a distinction between large and small countries, nor 
have they distinguished between openness in the trade account and openness in the 
capital account.  In order to investigate whether openness has historically affected the 
cost of external adjustment in large countries I added two interactive regressors to 
equations of the type of (17).  More specifically, I included the following terms:  (a) a 
variable that interacts the reversals indicator with trade openness (measure as exports plus 
imports over GDP); and (b) a variable that interacts the reversal indicator with an index 
of the degree of international capital mobility.  This index was developed by Edwards   39 
(2005), and ranges from zero to 100, with higher numbers denoting a higher degree of 
capital mobility.  The results obtained are presented in Table 14.    As may be seen, the 
coefficients of the reversal indicators continue to be significantly negative, as in Table 
13.  However, and in contrast with previous results obtained in other studies for broad 
samples of all countries – small and large; emerging and advanced – the variable that 
interacts trade openness and reversals is significantly negative, indicating that for large 
countries trade openness tends to amplify, rather than reduce, the negative effect of a 
current account reversal on growth.  The coefficient for the variable that interacts 
reversals with capital mobility is significantly positive in equation (14.1), suggesting that 
large countries that have a higher degree of capital mobility experience a smaller cost of 
adjustment than countries that restrict capital mobility.  In equation 14.2, however, the 
coefficient of this interactive variable is not significant.     
B. Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables Estimates:  The results discussed 
above were obtained using a random effects GLS for unbalanced panels, and under the 
assumption that the reversal variable is exogenous.  It is possible, however, that whether 
a reversal takes place is affected by growth performance, and, thus, is endogenously 
determined.  In order to deal with this issue I have re-estimated equation (17) using an 
instrumental variables GLS panel procedure.  In the estimation the following instruments 
were used:  (a) the ratio of the current account deficit to GDP lagged one and two 
periods.  (b) A lagged sudden stop dummy that takes the value of one if the country in 
question has experienced a sudden stop in the previous year. (c) An index that measures 
the relative occurrence of sudden stops in the country’s region (excluding the country 
itself) during that particular year.  This variable captures the effect of “regional 
contagion.” (d) The one-year lagged external gross debt over GDP ratio.  (e) The ratio of 
net international reserves to GDP, lagged one year.  (f) The one-year lagged rate of 
growth of domestic credit.  (g) The country’s initial GDP per capita (in logs).  The results 
obtained are presented in Table 15.   As may be seen, the coefficients of the reversal 
indicators are significantly negative, confirming that historically current account reversals 
have had a negative effect on growth.  The absolute value of the estimated coefficients, 
however, are larger than those obtained when random effects GLS were used (See Table 
13A).    40 
C. Terms of Trade Effects: The results in Table 13 were obtained controlling for 
terms of trade changes.   That is, the coefficient of the Reversal I and II coefficients 
capture the effect of a current account reversal maintaining terms of trade constant.  As 
discussed in Sections II and III, however, in large countries external adjustment is very 
likely to affect the terms of trade.   The exact nature of that effect will depend on a 
number of factors, including the size of the relevant elasticities and the extent of home 
bias in consumption.  In order to have an idea of the effect of current account reversals 
allowing for international price adjustments, I re-estimated equation (17) excluding the 
terms of trade variable for the “large countries” sample (detailed results not reported due 
to space constraints).  The estimated coefficients for the reversals coefficients were 
smaller (in absolute terms) than those in Table 12A.  The estimated coefficient of the 
Reversal I is now -2.43 (it is -3.81 in Table 13A).  The new estimated coefficient of 
Reversal II is now -3.63; it was -4.61 in Table 13A).  This suggests that for the sample in 
this paper external adjustment has been associated, on average, with an improvement in 
the international terms of trade.  
D.  Robustness and Other Extensions:  In order to check for the robusteness of the 
results I also estimated several versions of equation (17) for the large countries sample.   
In one of these exercises I introduced lagged values of the reversal indicators as 
additional regressors.  The results obtained – available on request – show that lagged 
values of these indexes were not significant at conventional levels.  I also varied the 
definition of “large countries;” the main message of the results, however, is not affected 
by the sample. 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
  In this paper I have illustrated the uniqueness of the current U.S. external 
situation.  Never in the history of modern economics has a large industrial country run 
persistent current account deficits of the magnitude posted by the U.S. since 2000.  These 
developments can be explained in the context of a portfolio model of the current account, 
where for a number of reasons – the end of the Cold War, the internet revolution, and the 
liberalization of international capital movements in most countries -- foreign investors’ 
increase their (net) demand for U.S. assets.  Indeed, by increasing their demand for U.S.   41 
assets from 305 to 40% of their wealth, foreigners have provided American residents with 
the needed funds to run the large deficits of the last few years.   
The future of the U.S. current account – and thus of the U.S. dollar – depend on 
whether foreign investors will continue to add U.S. assets to their investment portfolios.  
As a way of sharpening the discussion, in this paper I have deliberately made a (very) 
optimistic assumption:  I have assumed that during the last five years foreigners’ (net) 
demand for U.S. assets (as a proportion of U.S. GDP) doubles relative to its current level.  
The simulation model indicates that even under this optimistic assumption, in the not too 
distant future the U.S. will have to go through a significant adjustment in (the not too 
distant) future.  Indeed, it is not possible to rule out a scenario where the U.S. current 
account deficit would shrink abruptly by 3 to 6 percent of GDP.  According to the 
simulations, this type of adjustment would imply an accumulated real depreciation of the 
trade-weighted dollar in the range of 21%-28% during the firs three years of the 
adjustment.   
In order to have an idea of the possible consequences of this type of adjustment, I 
analyze the international evidence on current account reversals.  The results from this 
empirical investigation indicate that major current account reversals have tended to result 
in large declines in GDP growth.  Historically, “large countries” that have gone through 
major reversals have experienced deep GDP growth reductions. These estimates indicate 
that, on average, and with other factors given, the declined of GDP growth per capita has 
been in the range of 3.6 to 5.0 percent in the first year of the adjustment.  Three years 
after the initial adjustment GDP growth will still be below its long run trend. 
Although the results presented in this paper are revealing, and suggest that the 
U.S. is likely to experience a painful and costly adjustment in the not too distant future, 
there many questions still unresolved.  These include: 
·  The behavior of foreign central banks, including their future demand for 
U.S. assets.  A particularly important question is central banks’ 
appropriate international reserve policy in a world where most exchange 
rates have (at least) some flexibility.  A number of analysts are concerned 
that the Asian central banks would reduce their demand of U.S. assets, 
unleashing an abrupt collapse in the value of the dollar.   42 
·  We need a better understanding of the way adjustment works in large 
countries.  Although in Section IV I concentrated on the case of large 
countries, the nations in that sample that experienced current account 
reversals are much smaller than the U.S.  In particular, there is need to 
analyze the potential interest rate consequences of a major U.S. current 
account adjustment. 
·  Most models on the U.S. current account imbalance – including the 
portfolio model in Section III -- have focused on the RER.  Estimating the 
adjustment in the nominal exchange rates is not trivial, however.  The 
actual adjustment will depend on the pass through coefficient, as well as 
on exchange rate policies followed by some important U.S. trade partners, 
including China, Japan and other Asian countries. 
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Figure 1: Real Exchange Rate and Current Account
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Figure 2: Components of Current Account Deficit, 1946-2004
(Percent of GDP)
Source: International Transactions, Economic Report of President 2005
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Figure 3: U.S. Net International Investment Position, 1976-2004
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Figure 5: Base Case Simulation Results
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Figure 6: Simulation B Results
(Alternative Assumptions)  48 
Table 1 
U.S. Net Financial Flows: 1990-2004 
($ Billion) 
 
   1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
                                               
Reserves (net)  31.8  23.2  44.4  70.4  44.9  100.1  133.4  18.0  -26.7  52.3  42.5  23.1  110.3  250.1  358.1 
                               
Foreign private purchases   -2.5  18.8  37.1  24.4  34.3  91.5  147.0  130.4  28.6  -44.5  -70.0  -14.4  100.4  113.4  108.1 
of U.S. treasuries                                              
Currency  18.8  15.4  13.4  18.9  23.4  12.3  17.4  24.8  16.6  22.4  5.3  23.8  21.5  16.6  14.8 
Securities (net)  -27.2  -10.5  -19.1  -66.2  -6.2  -45.1  -46.0  44.6  32.1  182.6  338.0  309.2  301.4  178.6  323.2 
       Debt securities  -  -  -  -  -  -  13.0  84.2  145.5  104.2  267.7  300.3  269.8  241.8  360.1 
       Equity securities  -  -  -  -  -  -  -36.8  24.7  -30.3  84.5  93.0  12.6  37.5  -63.2  -36.8 
FDI (net)  11.3  -14.7  -28.4  -32.6  -34.0  -41.0  -5.4  0.8  36.4  64.5  162.1  24.7  -62.4  -133.9  -133.0 
Claims reported by non-banks 
(net) 
17.3  8.0  13.2  11.3  -35.0  14.4  -32.6  -5.2  -15.1  -21.5  31.9  57.6  32.6  55.1  -41.5 
Claims reported by banks (net)  8.6  3.4  37.4  55.7  100.1  -44.9  -75.1  7.9  4.2  -22.0  -31.7  -7.5  66.1  65.2  -15.6 
                                               
Net financing  58.0  43.5  97.9  81.8  127.4  87.3  138.7  221.3  76.2  233.8  478.0  416.6  569.9  542.7  614.0 
Current account deficit  79.0  -3.7  48.0  82.0  118.0  109.5  120.2  136.0  209.6  296.8  413.4  385.7  473.9  530.7  665.9 
Source: BEA, U.S. International Transactions and International Investment Position 
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Table 2 
U.S. Net International Investment Position and Current Account Deficit: 1998-2004 
($ Billion) 
 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
NIIP   900.0  775.5  1388.7  1889.7  2233.0  2430.7  -- 
Change in NIIP  79.3  -124.5  613.3  500.9  343.3  197.7  -- 
Current Account Deficit  209.5  296.8  413.4  385.7  473.9  530.7  617.7 
               
Valuation changes  130.2  421.3  -199.8  -115.2  130.6  333.0  -- 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis  
 
Table 3 
Distribution of Current Account Deficits 
By Region: 1970-2001 
 
Region  Mean  Median  1
st Perc.  1
st Quartile   3
rd Quartile   9
th Perc. 
             
  A: 1970-2001 
             
Industrialized countries  0.6  0.7  -3.8  -1.6  3.0  4.8 
Latin Am. and Caribbean  5.4  4.1  -2.5  1.1  8.0  16.9 
Asia  3.0  2.7  -7.1  -0.6  6.3  11.3 
Africa  6.3  5.3  -3.4  1.2  9.9  16.9 
Middle East  0.0  1.4  -18.8  -5.0  6.4  13.6 
Eastern Europe  3.9  3.0  -2.4  0.3  6.1  10.7 
             
Total  3.9  3.3  -5.0  -0.1  7.1  13.1 
             
  A: 1984-2001 
             
Industrialized countries  0.2  0.3  -4.7  -2.3  2.7  4.8 
Latin Am. and Caribbean  5.1  3.7  -2.5  1.1  7.0  17.0 
Asia  2.2  2.4  -8.0  -1.3  5.9  10.2 
Africa  5.9  4.6  -3.5  0.9  9.1  16.2 
Middle East  2.3  1.5  -12.4  -4.0  6.3  14.9 
Eastern Europe  4.0  3.1  -2.5  0.3  6.6  10.9 
             
Total  3.8  3.0  -4.8  -0.4  6.7  12.9 
             
Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Development Indicators 
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Table 4 
List of Countries with Persistent High Current Account Deficits 
By Region: 1970-2001 
 
Region/ Country  Period 
   
Industrialized Countries    
Ireland   1978-1984 
New Zealand   1984-1988 
Latin America and Caribbean   
Guyana   1979-1985       
Nicaragua   1984-1990 & 1992-2000 
Asia    
Bhutan   1982-1989 
Africa    
Guinea-Bissau   1982-1993 
Lesotho   1995-2000 
Eastern Europe    
Azerbaijan   1995-1999 




Net Sock of Liabilities: U.S and other Industrial Countries: Selected Years 
(Percent of GDP) 
 
  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2003 
Australia  --  --  47.4  55.1  65.2  59.1 
Canada  34.7  36.3  38.0  42.4  30.6  20.6 
Denmark  --  --  --  26.5  21.5  13.0 
Finland  14.6  19.0  29.2  42.3  58.2  35.9 
Iceland  --  --  48.2  49.8  55.5  66.0 
New Zealand  --  --  88.7  76.6  120.8  131.0 
Sweden  --  20.9  26.6  41.9  36.7  26.5 
United States  -12.9  -1.3  4.2  6.2  14.1  22.1 
  Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001).  
 
Table 6 
U.S. Current Account Adjustment and the U.S. Dollar: 














￿ Model tracks U.S. NIIP through 
time. 
 
￿ Analyzes trajectory of NIIP under 
three scenarios, and asks whether 
these trajectories are sustainable.  
 
￿ Elasticities-based adjustment 
mechanism. 
 




￿ Income elasticity of imports (1.7) 
exceeds income elasticity of exports 
(1.0). 
 
￿ Base case scenario assumes no RER 
adjustment for the USD. 
 
￿ A USD adjustment scenario 
assumes a RER depreciation of 25%. 
 
￿ A structural adjustment scenario 
assumes that exports’ elasticity 
increases to 1.3. 
 
 
￿ In base case scenario the NIIP 
becomes increasingly negative and 
the CA is unsustainable in the 
medium run. 
 
￿ Under RER depreciation scenario 
CA is within sustainable ranges even 
in a 10 year long horizon.  
 
￿ Under structural adjustment, CA 
deficit is 3% in a 10 year horizon, if 
the global economy has high 
performance. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) 
 
 
￿ Develops and calibrates optimizing 
model of small open economy, with 
two goods: tradable and nontradable. 
 
￿ Output is exogenous; prices are 
assumed to be flexible; monetary 
policy stabilizes the price level. 
 
￿ Analyzes the effect on RER of an 
exogenous shock that results in a 
reduction of the CA deficit of 4.4% of 
GDP. 
￿ Elasticity of substitution between 
tradables and nontradables is assumed 
to be equal to one. 
 
￿ Assumes a 6% nominal interest rate, 
and a NIIP of 20% of GDP. 
 
￿ Tradables output is assumed to be 
25% of GDP. 
 
￿ Assumes that full-employment is 
maintained. 
￿ Base case result indicates that an 
elimination of the CA deficit will 
imply a 16% RER depreciation, and a 
12% nominal depreciation of the 
USD. 
 
￿ Assuming a share of tradables equal 
to 15%, results in a RER depreciation 
of 20%. 
 
￿ The effect on the nominal value of 
the USD could be even higher if the 











O’Neill and Hatzious (2002) 
 
 
￿ Analyzes the trajectory of NIIP as a 
percentage of GDP. 
 
￿ Argues that at the observed levels of 
CA deficits, the NIIP is moving 
towards the levels of Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand.  It is 
difficult to believe that this is possible 
for a large country such as the U.S.  
 
 ￿ Estimates “required” RER 
depreciation in order to bring CA 




￿ Analyzes the rates of return obtained 
by foreign owners of U.S. assets. 
 
￿ Argues that with the exception of 
FDI these rates of return have been 
modest. 
 
￿ Shows that FDI has declined 
significantly as a source of financing 




￿ It is unlikely that U.S. will be able to 
continue to attract foreign purchasing 
for its assets at observed low rates of 
return.  Thus, the U.S. CA deficit is 
clearly unsustainable. 
 
￿ A return to sustainability would )2% 
CA deficit) will imply a depreciation 





￿ Calibrates a partial equilibrium 
model to obtain set of bilateral RER 
consistent with attaining certain 
(exogenous) current account deficits. 
 
￿ No attempt is made to determine 
what is the sustainable level of the 
U.S. current account. 
 
￿ Considers the effect of a U.S. fiscal 




￿ To determine initial conditions, 
author estimates “underlying” (or 
cycle-adjusted) CA balances. 
 
￿ Considers 3 possible long term 
scenarios: 1%, 2% and 3% CA deficit. 
 
￿ Three-good partial equilibrium 
model (including a nontraded) of 
small economy. 
 
￿ Elasticities and other parameter 
values taken from regression analysis 
and from OECD data set. 
 
 
￿ CA deficit of 2% of GDP is 
consistent with a yen/dollar rate of 88, 
and a dollar/euro of 1.18. 
 
￿ If there is a positive technological 
shock, the “sustainable” CA deficit 
may be higher.  This would be 
consistent a yen/dollar rate of 89-100, 
and a dollar/euro of 1.11-1.19. 
 
￿ Estimates that if China has a CA 
surplus of 1% of GDP the Rmb/USD 
would be 6.71. 










Benassy-Quere et al (2004) 
 
￿ Estimates econometrically RER path 
consistent with nontradable 
equilibrium. 
 
￿ The RER is assumed to depend on 
the country’s net foreign assets (NFA) 
position and on relative productivity. 
 
￿ Model estimated simultaneously for 
15 currencies. 
 
￿ Data on NFA obtained from lane 
and Milessi-Ferreti (2004) and 
relative productivities obtained as 
ratio of CPI to PPI. 
 
￿ No attempt is made to impose 
external equilibrium condition. 
 
￿ Rsults provided for two cases:  USD 
as numeraire and euro as numeraire.  
 
￿ The extent of misalignment of the 
different currencies depends on how 
broad is the adjustment. 
 
￿ Using the USD as numeraire, 
estimates that in 2003 the euro was 
undervalued between 1.2% and 7.6%. 
 
￿ Using the USD as numeraire, 
estimates that in 2001 the yen was 




￿ Analyzes trajectory of NIIP and 
argues that it is unlikely that it will 
continue to grow at current pace.  If it 
did it would reach 100% of GDP. 
 
￿ Argues that challenge is for RER 
adjustment to be gradual and that it 
does not disrupt growth. 
 
￿ Argues that fiscal adjustment in the 
U.S. is necessary for smooth 
correction of imbalances. 
 
￿ No attempt is made at calculating 
the “outer limit” of U.S. NIIP. 
 
￿ Analyzes the RER adjustment 
compatible with a gradual reduction 
of the CA deficit to 2% of GDP and a 
NIIP between 40% and 50%. 
￿ Based on results from large 
econometric models assumes that a 
1% reduction of the U.S. CA deficit is 
associated with a 10% depreciation of 
the RER. 
￿ Relative to its value in mid 2004, 
Mussa calculates that the RER will 
have to depreciate another 20% to 
achieve a long term CA deficit of 2%. 
 
￿ Discusses policies that will assist the 
adjustment process:  (a) Fiscal 
consolidation in the U.S. will help 
keep U.S. demand growing below the 
pace of output growth. (b) Monetary 
policy in Europe and Japan should be 
more expansive. 
 
￿ Concludes that “some” international 
policy cooperation is likely to help the 














￿ Update of O’Neill and Hatzious 
(2002) model. 
 
￿ Analyzes the trajectory of NIIP as a 
percentage of GDP, and finds that 
path is not sustainabl. 
 
￿ Introduces the role of productivity 
gains to original framework. 
 
￿ Analyzes the composition of capital 
flows into the U.S. 
 




￿ Estimates a trade balance equation 
and uses the coefficients to compute 
the “required” RER depreciation to 
achieve different CA adjustment 
targets. 
 
￿ Trade equation also includes foreign 




￿ A reduction of the CA deficit to 3% 
would imply RER depreciation of the 
order of 21.6% to 23.6%. 
 
￿ A reduction of the CA deficit to 2% 
would imply RER depreciation of the 
order of 32.1% to 34.1%. 
 
￿ An elimination of the CA deficit to 
2% would imply RER depreciation of 
the order of 53% to 55%. (Notice that 
these figures are significantly higher 









￿ Extension of the Obstfeld-Rogoff 
(2002) model to a two-country world. 
 
￿ Terms of trade are now endogenous. 
 
￿ Incorporates the effects of valuation 
effects of exchange rate changes on 
NIIP. 
 
￿ Exercise assumes an elimination of 
the CA deficit; that is a reduction in 




￿ Ratio of CA deficit to tradables is 
25%; CA deficit is 5% of GDP. 
 
￿ Output is exogenously given in both 
countries. 
 
￿ NIIP is 20% of GDP. 
 
￿ Home country produces 22% of 
world tradables. 
 
￿ Simulation is done for alternative 
values of elasticities, and under 
different assumptions regarding 




￿ Assuming constant output, an 
elimination of the CA deficit implies 
RER depreciation between 14.7% and 
33.6%. 
 
￿ If tradables output increases by 
20%, the RER depreciation ranges 
from 9.8% to 22.5%. 
 
￿ If there is a permanent increase in 
military expenditure,the RER 
depreciation ranges from 16.0% to 
36.1%. 










Roubini and Setser (2004) 
 
 
￿ Uses macro aggregate model to 
project the U.S. current account.   
 
￿ Imposes exogenous assumptions on 




￿First scenario considers a constant 
RER dollar. 
  
￿Second scenario considers a constant 
trade deficit at 5% of GDP, and a 
RER depreciation of approximately 
7%. 
 
￿ Third scenario considers a faster rate 
of growth of exports, and substantial 
(50%) depreciation.  This scenario 
also assumes a gradual elimination 
(by 2012) of the fiscal deficit. 
 
 
￿In first scenario, CA deficit 13% of 
GDP in 2012. 
 
￿In second scenario, CA deficit 9% of 
GDP in 2012. 
 
￿In third scenario, the NIIP stabilizes 
at approximately 55% of GDP, and 
the CA deficit declines gradually, 




Blanchard, Giavazzi, Sa (2005) 
 
 
￿ Uses portfolio model to analyze 
U.S. current account behavior. 
   
￿ Assumes changes in portfolio 




￿ Considers dynamics of adjustment. 
 
￿ Considers valuation effects of 
changes in the U.S. dollar. 
 
￿ Simulates model under certain 
assumptions for values of key 
parameters (elasticities, portfolio 
shares and other).   
 
￿ The question asked is: what is the 
required (real) depreciation of the 
U.S. dollar to eliminate the current 
account deficit?     
 
 
￿ Estimates range of required U.S. 
dollar real depreciation (today).  After 
incorporating the role of valuation 
effects the range is estimated to be 
between 40% and 90% real 
depreciation.   




Variables  Parameter Values  Comments and Values in Alternative 
Simulations 
     
 
A.  Portfolio Adjustment 
 
World
Initial W   USD 80 Trillion  World wealth in U.S. dollars in 2005. 
US
Initial W   USD 36 Trillion  U.S. wealth in U.S. dollars in 2005. 
Initial a   0.300  Foreigners’ demand for U.S. assets in 
(early) 2005. 
Initial jj, a   0.730  U.S. residents’ demand for U.S. assets in 
(early) 2005. 
Final a   0.400  Foreigners’ portfolio allocation for U.S. 
assets in 2010.  In Simulation B I assume 
that after reaching 0.40 a declines 
gradually to 0.365.  It reaches this new 
value in 2014. 
Final jj, a   0.710  U.S. residents’ demand for U.S. assets in 
(early) 2010.  In Simulation B I assume that 
after reaching 0.71  jj a changes to 0.72 as a 
final value in 2014. 
Historical a   0.205  Foreigners’ demand for U.S. assets in 
(early) 1996.  Move to current 0.30 is 
assumed to have been gradual. 
Historical jj, a   0.800  U.S. residents’ demand for U.S. assets in 
(early) 1996. 
l   3  Wealth to GDP ratio. 
*
Initial g   0.290  Gamma in (early) 2005. 
*
Final g   0.600  Final gamma in 2010. 
*
Historical g   0.150  Initial gamma in 1996. 
Adjustment period 
for a and  jj a  
Five years   
  






Variables  Parameter Values  Comments and Values in Alternative 
Simulations 
 
B.  Transfer Problem 
 
g   0.03  Assumed to be the long-term sustainable 
rate of growth of U.S. GDP. 
* g   0.03  Rest of the world growth (this includes the 
emerging countries as well as Europe and 
Japan). 
p   0.023  Long term U.S. inflation. 
 
* p   0.023  A slightly higher value (0.03) was used in 
some of the simulations. 
i  0.043  Other simulations used a higher value in 
the range 0.05 to 0.065. 
* i   0.053  Alternative values in the range 0.06 to 
0.075. 
e h   -1.10  This is slightly below the consensus price 
elasticity for U.S. imports.  Range of 
values used in other simulations. 
e e   0.35  Approximate consensus value for RER 
elasticity of U.S. exports.  Sensitivity 
analysis used range 0.2/0.6. 
y h   1.50  Consensus value for income elasticity of 
U.S. imports. 
y e   1.00  Consensus value for income elasticity of 
U.S. imports. 
m s   0.14  Share of imports in U.S. GDP in 2004. 
x s   0.09  Share of exports in U.S. GDP in 2004. 
* ˆ m p   0  In alternative simulations a range of -.05 to 
-.10 was used. 
* ˆ x p   0  In alternative simulations a range of .05 to 
.07 was used. 
y   0.30  Partial adjustment coefficient; value chosen 
to obtain best possible fit for 1996-2004 
period. 
k   0.20  Partial adjustment coefficient; value chosen 
to obtain best possible fit for 1996-2004 
period.  
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Table 8 
Incidence of Current Account Reversals: 1970-2001 
(Percentages) 
 
Region  Reversal I  Reversal II 
         
  No reversal  Reversal  No reversal  Reversal 
         
Industrial countries  97.3  2.7  98.0  2.0 
Latin American and Caribbean  92.0  8.0  87.7  12.3 
Asia  88.3  11.7  87.7  12.3 
Africa  88.3  11.7  83.4  16.6 
Middle East  86.6  13.4  85.0  15.0 
Eastern Europe  90.7  9.3  88.9  11.1 
         
Total  90.8  9.2  88.2  11.8 
         
     Pearson         
         Uncorrected chi2 (5)  37.31  67.42 
         Design-based F(5, 12500)  7.46  13.08 
          P-value  0.00  0.00 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Development Indicators 
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Table 9 
Incidence of Current Account Reversals and Sudden Stops: 1970-2001 
(Percentages) 
 
  Reversal I  Reversal II 
     
A. Large Countries     
     
Reversal | Sudden  9.3  25.5 
Sudden | Reversal  7.0  15.6 
           c
2(1)  1.3  27.5 
            P-value  0.26  0.00 
     
B. Industrial Countries     
     
Reversal | Sudden  5.0  18.2 
Sudden | Reversal  7.1  28.6 
           c
2(1)  0.4  23.6 
            P-value  0.51  0.00 
     
C. All Countries     
     
Reversal | Sudden  21.1  51.0 
Sudden | Reversal  15.0  26.7 
           c
2(1)  26.6  262.5 
            P-value  0.00  0.00 
     
     
  x| y denotes the probability of occurrence of x given the occurrence of y 
  Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Development Indicators 
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Table 10 
Percentage of Reversals that also Correspond to Currency Crisis 
(P-Value of c
2 in parenthesis) 
 
  Contemporaneous 
joint occurrence 
Crisis lagged one 
period 
Crisis lagged two 
periods 
  Crisis A  Crisis B  Crisis A  Crisis B  Crisis A  Crisis B 
             
A.  Reversal I             
             
Large Countries  26.7  16.1  43.1  17.2  34.5  13.8 
  (0.09)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.05) 
Industrial Countries  6.7  0.0  25.0  12.5  50.0  12.5 
              (0.49)  (0.43)  (0.16)  (0.10)  (0.00)  (0.11) 
All Countries  21.2  9.1  25.6  10.3  22.2  9.8 
              (0.10)  (0.38)  (0.00)  (0.08)  (0.01)  (0.09) 
             
B. Reversal II             
             
Large Countries  31.2  18.2  42.9  15.6  29.5  12.8 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
Industrial Countries  28.6  14.3  35.7  0.0  26.7  6.7 
              (0.09  (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.43)  (0.11)  (0.67) 
All Countries  20.2  10.0  23.8  11.5  16.7  8.2 
  (0.05  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.86)  (0.47) 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Development Indicators 
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Table 11 
Mean Changes in Nominal and Real Exchange Rates: Reversal I 
Accumulated change between the year of reversal and three years before 
(Percentages) 
 
  Treatment  Control  Kruskal-Wallis test 
(p-value)* 
   
  Nominal Exchange Rate 
       
Large Countries  33.1  9.2  0.00 
Industrial Countries  18.9  3.2  0.19 
All Countries  27.5  9.5  0.00 
   
  Real Exchange Rate** 
       
Large Countries  1.4  0.04  0.12 
Industrial Countries  9.3  1.6  0.55 
All Countries  -4.0  3.6  0.00 
       
  * Null Hypothesis: Data from treatment and control countries have been drawn from  
   the same population. 
  ** A positive number means real exchange rate appreciation. 
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Table 12 
Current Account Reversals: Random Effects Probit Model – Unbalanced Panel 
Large Countries 
Variable  (12.1)  (12.2)  (12.3)  (12.4) 
       
  Reversal I  Reversal II 
         
Current-Account deficit to GDP  0.05  0.05  0.19  0.19 
  (1.65)***  (1.63)***  (5.46)*  (5.53)* 
Sudden stop   0.82  0.83  0.93  0.83 
  (2.06)**  (2.08)**  (2.46)**  (2.24)** 
Sudden stops in region   0.78  0.80  1.42  1.64 
  (0.66)  (0.68)  (1.54)  (1.84)*** 
External debt to GDP   0.01  0.01  0.001  0.001 
  (2.81)*  (2.88)*  (0.29)  (0.32) 
Domestic credit growth  0.001  0.001  0.0002  0.0003 
  (2.50)**  (2.52)**  (1.65)***  (1.71)*** 
Fiscal deficit to GDP  -0.004  --  0.05  -- 
  (0.12)  --  (1.85)***  -- 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.28  -0.29  -0.15  -0.16 
  (2.19)**  (2.23)**  (1.57)  (1.66)*** 
Observations  545  582  557  597 
Countries  36  37  36  37 
Absolute value of z statistics are reported in parentheses; explanatory variables are one-period 
lagged variable; country-specific dummies are included, but not reported.  
* significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10%  
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Table 13 
Current Account Reversals, Sudden Stops and Growth  
(Random Effects GLS Estimates) 
  (13.1)  (13.2) 
 
(13.3)  (13.4)  (13.5) 
              A. Large Countries 
           
Growth gap  0.67  0.72  0.68  0.66  0.71 
  (21.20)*  (25.33)*  (22.82)*  (20.54)*  (24.60)* 
Change in terms of trade  0.09  0.10  0.08  0.08  0.10 
  (7.88)*  (10.30)*  (7.99)*  (7.34)*  (9.52)* 
Reversal I  -2.12  --  --  -2.11  -- 
  (3.94)*  --  --  (3.89)*  -- 
Reversal II  --  -4.13  --  --  -3.74 
  --  (9.34)*  --  --  (7.94)* 
Sudden Stop  --  --  -2.36  -2.39  -1.37 
  --  --  (3.99)*  (3.99)*  (2.36)** 
Constant  -0.28  -0.21  -0.31  -0.18  -0.18 
  (2.10)**  (1.70)***  (2.36)**  (1.36)  (1.39) 
           
Observations  799  846  811  764  810 
Countries  41  41  41  41  41 
R-squared  0.41  0.50  0.45  0.42  0.50 
           
  B. All Countries 
           
Growth gap  0.82  0.82  0.81  0.82  0.82 
  (40.26)*  (42.10)*  (40.18)*  (38.93)*  (40.76)* 
Change in terms of trade  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.07  0.08 
  (11.77)*  (12.65)*  (11.31)*  (11.10)*  (12.18)* 
Reversal I  -1.04  --  --  -0.73  -- 
  (3.00)*  --  --  (2.03)**  -- 
Reversal II  --  -2.01  --  --  -1.80 
  --  (6.64)*  --  --  (5.50)* 
Sudden Stop  --  --  -1.23  -1.02  -0.53 
  --  --  (2.82)*  (2.28)**  (1.19) 
Constant  -0.30  -0.15  -0.27  -0.26  -0.14 
  (2.26)**  (1.16)  (2.62)*  (2.33)**  (1.32) 
Observations  1723  1821  1641  1546  1635 
Countries  90  90  81  81  81 
R-squared  0.48  0.49  0.51  0.52  0.51 
Absolute value of t statistics are reported in parentheses; country-specific dummies are included, 
but not reported; *significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.   
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Table 14 
Current Account Reversals, Sudden Stops and Growth: Trade and Capital Mobility 
Large Countries 
(Random Effects GLS Estimates) 
  (14.1)  (14.2)  (14.3)  (14.4) 
                   
Growth gap  0.67  0.67  0.68  0.68 
  (21.17)*  (21.12)*  (22.35)*  (22.40)* 
Change in terms of trade  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09 
  (7.78)*  (7.83)*  (8.77)*  (8.79)* 
Reversal I  -3.48  -3.84  --  -- 
  (1.98)**  (4.42)*  --  -- 
Reversal I * Trade  0.27  0.27  --  -- 
  (2.47)**  (2.55)**  --  -- 
Reversal I * Capital Mobility  -0.007  --  --  -- 
  (0.24)  --  --  -- 
Reversal II  --  --  -1.92  -4.12 
  --  --  (1.38)  (7.94)* 
Reversal II * Trade  --  --  -0.02  -0.04 
  --  --  (0.58)  (1.27) 
Reversal II * Capital Mobility  --  --  -0.05  -- 
  --  --  (1.70)***  -- 
Constant  -0.28  -0.29  -0.16  -0.16 
  (2.14)**  (2.19)**  (1.26)  (1.27) 
Observations  794  793  793  793 
Countries  41  41  41  41 
R-squared  0.38  0.38  0.43  0.43 
         
Absolute value of t statistics are reported in parentheses; country-specific dummies are included, 
but not reported. 
*significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%  
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Table 15 
Current Account Reversals, Sudden Stops and Growth: Large Countries 
(IV Estimates) 
  (15.1)  (15.2) 
           
Growth gap  0.86  0.89 
  (18.50)*  (20.50)* 
Change in terms of trade  0.06  0.11 
  (3.87)*  (6.86)* 
Reversal I  -9.40  -- 
  (4.55)*  -- 
Reversal II  --  -12.24 
  --  (7.40)* 
Constant  0.24  0.38 
  (1.27)  (1.95)*** 
Observations  514  538 
Countries  34  34 
R-squared  0.41  0.40 
     
  Absolute value of t statistics are reported in parentheses; country-specific dummies  
  are included, but not reported. 
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Appendix 
Description of the Data 
 
Variable  Definition  Source 
      Current-Account  
Reversal I 
Reduction  in  the  current  account 
deficit of at least 6% of GDP in three 
years.  Initial  balance  has  to  be  a 
deficit 
Author’s  elaboration  based  on 
data  of  current  account  deficit 
(World Development Indicators) 
     
Current-Account  
Reversal II 
Reduction  in  the  current  account 
deficit of at least 4% of GDP in one 
year. Initial balance has to be a deficit 
Author’s  elaboration  based  on 
data  of  current  account  deficit 
(World Development Indicators) 
     
Sudden Stop  Reduction of net capital inflows of at 
least  5%  of  GDP  in  one  year.  The 
country  in  question  must  have 
received an inflow of capital larger to 
its  region’s  third  quartile  during  the 
previous  two  years  prior  to  the 
“sudden stop.”   
Author’s  elaboration  based  on 
data of financial account (World 
Development Indicators) 
     
Currency Crisis A  Dummy variable for occurrence of a 
currency  crisis:  index  of  “external 
pressures”  exceeds  its  mean  by  3 
standard deviation 
Author’s  elaboration  based  on 
data of international reserves and 
nominal exchange rate.   
     
Currency Crisis B  Dummy variable for occurrence of a 
currency  crisis:  index  of  “external 
pressures”  exceeds  its  mean  by  3 
standard  deviation  exclusively  by 
changes in the nominal exchange rate  
Author’s  elaboration  based  on 
data of nominal exchange rate.  
     
Nominal exchange 
rate 
Local currency units per dollar  International Financial Statistics, 
IMF 
     
Real exchange rate   Bilateral CPI based real exchange rate   Author’s  elaboration  based  on 
data  of  nominal  exchange  rate 
and CPI. (International Financial 
Statistics, IMF) 
     
Terms of trade  Change  in  terms  of  trade-exports  as 
capacity to import (constant LCU) 
World Development Indicators 
     
Reserves to GDP   Net international reserves over GDP  World Development Indicators 
     
Domestic credit 
growth  
Annual growth rate of domestic credit  World Development Indicators 
      
  67 
Appendix 
Description of the Data 
(Continuation) 
 
Variable  Definition  Source 
     
External debt to 
GDP 
Total external debt over GDP  World Development Indicators 
     
Fiscal deficit to GDP  Overall budget to GDP   World Development Indicators 
     
GDP per capita  GDP per capita in 1995 US$ dollars  World Development Indicators 
     
Index of capital 
mobility 
Index:  (low  mobility)  to  100  (high 
mobility) 
Edwards (2005) 
     
Openness  Trade openness: exports plus imports 
over GDP 
World Development Indicators 
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